Seeing the Forest for the Trees in CERCLA Liability by Strasser, Kurt A. & Rodosevich, Denise




The determination of CERCLA liability for corporate subsidiaries, individu-
al corporate actors, lenders, and others who do not actually own or operate
a hazardous waste site has proven to be a particularly vexing problem. Cases
dealing with these categories of individuals or compahies present different fact
patterns and have, for the most part, each been subject to a separate analysis
for liability. Thus, for example, one finds that cases involving corporate actor
liability are based on the case law concerning corporate actors, and cases
involving lender liability are based on the case law for this category of individ-
ual or institution. The result is a confusing array of separate liability rules for
corporate subsidiaries, individual corporate actors, lenders, and other involved
parties. By surveying all these categories of liability cases, the authors
demonstrate that the confusion is replaced by the revelation that general
liability principles, do, in fact, exist. First, CERCLA liability extends to those
who directly manage the general business operations. Second, liability will
reach all those who assume and exercise responsibility for handling hazardous
substances. Analyzing the case law from the standpoint of these two principles
will demystify the subject of CERCLA liability and provide greater certainty
for all parties who face the potential risk of liability under the statute.
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Introduction
Liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund)' is widely thought to be
inexplicable, random, and often disastrous in consequence. This is particularly
true with respect to the liability of parties who are not now involved in the
storage or disposal of the hazardous substances at issue, but who have had a
tie to those hazardous substances. Many perceive Superfund liability to
constitute a mindless search for deep pockets, instead of a body of general
principles that provides predictability. We will argue that this perception arises
from a tendency by courts and counsel to separate cases into rigid, poorly
chosen categories, and that this perception is incorrect upon a studied
examination of the case law.
The familiar forest and trees problem exists in the area of CERCLA liability
because Superfund cases have been classified too crudely and rigidly. The case
law in this area has been categorized by the types of entities that are potentially
subject to CERCLA liability: corporate subsidiaries, lenders, dissolved
corporations, and bankruptcy trustees, for example. While these categories have
their uses, they have been.too confining, and restrict the ability of counsel and
judges to see the forest of general principles from the trees of specific fact
patterns. This Article examines the specific trees, but its primary goal is to
describe the forest.
This forest is made up of two general principles of Superfund liability. First,
liability extends to all those who have assumed-and exercised responsibility for
handling hazardous substances, including handling related to environmental
compliance. Second, liability extends to parties with supervisory authority over
general business operations that included, or should have included, waste
handling and environmental compliance responsibilities. However, as a
corollary, parties far removed from the day-to-day management of the business
and its wastes will typically not be held liable as either operators of waste
disposal facilities or arrangers for waste disposal just because they had an
unexercised "capacity to control" the business. Our conclusions are based on
an analysis of the results and differing rationales of many CERCLA liability
cases. These principles, this vision of the forest, are particularly significant
because they are drawn from a factually diverse group of cases. Courts have
followed these principles, for the most part, without either articulating them or
cross-referencing to cases in other fact pattern categories.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75
(1988).
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Originally conceived as a type of insurance fund that would spread the cost
of toxic waste cleanup, Superfund emphasized the principle that quick cleanup
was essential. However, the policy of quick cleanup now seems a naive
aspiration. The "polluter pays" principle, also part of the original statutory
intention, has now become the primary force driving CERCLA. Superfund has
become a liability-driven regulatory scheme, and the assignment of liability
reportedly consumes as much, if not more, time and resources as the actual
cleanups themselves.2
Liability is primarily based on three concepts in the statutory scheme:
owners, operators, and waste treatment arrangers. The first two, "owners" and
"operators," are linked together in the statutory formulation. 3 Liable owners
include present owners of the waste disposal facility, as well as past owners
who owned the facility when the wastes in question were stored at the facility.
Where a person or business is an owner of a facility, except for a very limited
number of defenses, the inquiry need go no farther in order for liability to
attach.' Courts, for the most part, have taken a straightforward approach in
2. William N. Hedeman et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective on the Superfund
Liability Scheme, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413, 10,423 (July 1991) (citing OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMING CLEAN, SUPERFUND PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED 29, n.13 (Oct. 1989)
(estimates by the Office of Technology Assessment that "20 to 40 percent of total spending for the
Superfund program is inefficient because of prolonged negotiations and litigation between EPA and PRPs
[Potentially Responsible Parties]")); Sargeant, Superfiund Contractors Clean Up Few Waste Dumps But
Management Costs Rise, 27 TRIAL 93(2) (Oct. 1991); Michael Weisskopf, Superfund Spending Inquiries
Set, WASH. POST, June 20, 1991, at A4 (reporting that one-third of Superfund spending since 1988 was used
for administrative "program management" and not for actual cleanup); Michael Weisskopf, Administrative
Costs Drain Superfund, Few Toxic Waste Sites Actually Cleaned Up, WASH. POST, June 19, 1991, at Al.
See, e.g., William W. Balcke, Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA.
L. REV. 123, 131 n.46 (1988) (noting that in one case involving the Conservation Chemical Co. the cost
of cleanup was estimated to be between $10 and $18 million dollars while pretrial costs totalled $2 million
for the government and $5 to $12 million for the defendants contesting liability.)
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (2) (1988) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in
subsection (b) of this. section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of... shall be liable ....
Defendants have unsuccessfully argued that the conjunctive use of "owner and operator" in §
9607(a)(1) requires the current owner also to be an operator in order for liability to attach. See, e.g., Artesian
Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280-81 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.
1988).
Transporter liability is also provided by the statute, CERCLA § 107(a)(4), but has not been proven
to be particularly contentious as courts have generally agreed that Congress did not intend to hold
transporters liable where they did not choose the site for waste disposal or treatment. See United States v.
Western Processing Co. 756 F. Supp. 1416 (W.D. Wa. 1991); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298
(E.D. Mo. 1987); cf. Ronald M. Eddy & Diana Terry Reindl, Transporter Liability Under CERCLA, 16
Envtl. L: Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,244 (Sept. 1986) (describing problems facing transporters of hazardous
waste under CERCLA and potential strategies to minimize liability).
4. In the following cases, each owner was seemingly without knowledge that the acquired land was
contaminated and without fault in creating the hazard, but each was nevertheless held liable as an "owner:"
NL Indus. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1986); T&E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp.
696, 698-99 (D.N.J. 1988); Jersey City Redev. Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (D.N.J. 1987);
City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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deciding whether a party is a liable owner. Problems have nevertheless arisen
in determining the liability of parties who hold less than complete title, such
as trust beneficiaries and secured lenders.' Nevertheless, determining who is
liable as an "owner" has proven to be a simpler task than determining who is
liable as an "operator."
Determining operator liability has proven much more troublesome, in part,
because of the numerous scenarios which can confer operator status upon an
entity. As with owners, the statute reaches operators who ran the facility at the
time of waste disposal, as well as those who run it now.6 Interpreting and
applying the statute to identify these parties, however, is not the main source
of trouble. Problems arise when one considers whether parties that have had
some, but not complete, influence or control over the operation of the facility
should be liable as operators. Extending CERCLA liability to parent companies
and other members of the corporate enterprise presents a complex set of
questions. Corporate officers, directors, and shareholders directly involved in
managing a facility and its hazardous substances may also be held individually
liable. The status of successor companies, previously dissolved companies,
trustees, receivers, executors, and administrators, in a given case, may also force
the drawing of a fine line to determine the type and extent of involvement
necessary for operator liability to attach. Creditors of the primary operator can
become potentially liable as operators when they offer management advice and
exercise some supervision, as they frequently do, to protect their security.
Similarly, difficult issues exist at the outermost boundary of Superfund liability
concerning parties who contract to design and build facilities, to obtain
manufacturing services, or to enter a franchise relationship.
The third statutory group upon which liability is imposed are waste
treatment arrangers--those who arranged for the disposal, treatment, or
transport of hazardous substances.7 The imposition of generator liability
implements the principle that the "polluter pays." In effect, the liability for
hazardous waste creation exists as long as the waste remains hazardous.
Liability is typically clear under the statute for a company whose manufacturing
operations created the waste. Moving beyond this straightforward case, once
again, the many different fact patterns illustrated in the cases demonstrate the
existence of numerous potential arrangers. Possibilities include: parent and
sibling corporations, officers and directors, trustees, executors, supervising
5. See infra Parts I and VuI for a fuller discussion on the potential CERCLA liability of trust
beneficiaries and secured lenders.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (2) (1988).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), (4) (1988). This subsection provides that: "any person who by contract,
agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances ... shall be liable .... "
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lenders, and contracting parties whose jobs involved in any way the arranging
for hazardous substances handling. Determining who in the arrangement is
liable under CERCLA presents many of the same questions as those posed by
operator liability, and the answers frequently overlap.
With all three statutory groups of liable parties, the courts have given a
most expansive interpretation to CERCLA. Emphasizing the remedial nature
of the statutory cleanup scheme, courts have willingly extended liability well
into the periphery of debatable statutory coverage, leaving individuals and
businesses with wholly unanticipated liability. In addition, the statute has been
interpreted to have retroactive impact which means that liability today can be
based on conduct undertaken years ago, even if it was in compliance with the
applicable environmental regulations governing at the time.8
Furthermore, strict liability is the rule. No proof that the defendant's waste
or conduct caused the present harm or threat of harm is needed. Liability
among all of the "potentially responsible parties" is typically joint and several,
a provision with particular bite now that today's cleanups are reported to
average $25 million.' Strict joint and several liability can leave a party with
a much greater share of the cleanup bill than its contribution to the problem.
Contribution among liable parties is provided for,"° but solvent contributors
may be difficult to find.
Parts I through V of this Article will look at cases with fact patterns that
demonstrate the two liability principles under CERCLA. CERCLA liability will
be shown to extend, first, to all those who directly manage the general business
operations of the entity involved and, second, to those who manage its
hazardous substances and wastes. Parts I and II discuss two groups of corporate
liability cases, parent company liability for subsidiary activities, and
individual--officer, director, and shareholder-liability for corporate activities.
The existence of the same two principles find strong support in the cases
8. See Note, Development in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458,1539-42,1555-
63 (1986); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (hazardous waste disposal occurred in the early 1970s prior to enactment
of CERCLA but retroactive liability under CERCLA applies and does not violate due process or the takings
clause); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (waste disposal liability
incurred for disposal activity in 1960).
Of note also is the frequency with which the potentially liable party is one engaged in the recycling
business-a business that has developed in response to the need for environmental protection. See, e.g., In
re Bergsoe Metal Corp. v. East Asiatic Co., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990) (lead recycling); In re T.P. Long
Chem. Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (rubber recycling).
9. Keith Schneider, EPA Announces New Steps to Prod Cleanup of Wastes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991,
at Al ("on average, cleanup projects take 7 to 10 years to complete at a cost of more than [$]25 million");
Robert Bell & John Machir, Hazardous Waste Cleanup Structured Settlements Help Reduce the Cost,
BUSINESS INSURANCE, Oct. 22, 1990, at 51 (noting that cleanup costs average 25 million and more than
50% of the cleanups then underway were paid by PRPs); R. Lisle Baker & Michael J. Markoff, By-Products
Liability: Using Common Law Private Actions to Clean Up Hazardous Waste Sites, 10 HARV. ENv TL. L.
REV. 99, 101 n.14 (1986) (contending that most cleanups cost $8 to $10 million.).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988).
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dealing with lending arrangements, leases, and other contracts and government
activities, discussed in Parts III, IV, and V, respectively.
While the last three groups of cases we discuss also lend support to our
hypothesis, the support is weaker and indirect. Two involve corporate cases of
successor liability and dissolved corporations, Parts VI and VII respectively,
and are primarily concerned with the proximity of the defendants to the primary
owner, operator, or generator. The last group of cases, Part VIII, focuses on
beneficiaries, executors, and trustees. The case law that exists within this group,
is limited; however, what does exist supports our hypothesis. Taken together,
these cases represent a diverse array of fact.patterns, and it is this diversity that
provides the strongest support for our hypothesis.
I. Parent and Sibling Corporation Liability
Parent corporations, and to a lesser extent corporate siblings, have presented
one of the most attractive targets for expanding Superfund liability beyond the
immediate waste disposer or generator." In general, the results of the cases
support both of our two liability principles. First, courts have generally been
willing to find parent corporations liable whenever they have been actively
involved in the subsidiary's operations that produce hazardous waste. Second,
11. This section draws heavily on PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS
OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION (Little,
Brown & Co., 1989) §§ 18.02.1-.02.4, and the 1992 Cumulative Supplement. There is a substantial and
growing law review literature addressing the issue of parent corporate liability. See, e.g., Lynda J. Oswald
& Cindy K. Schipani, Legal Theory: CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine,
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 259 (1992); Richard B. Stewart & Bradley M. Campbell, Lessons From Parent Liability
Under CERCLA, 6 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 7 (1992) (arguing parent liability should turn on the extent of day-to-
day involvement with subsidiary management); Cindy A. Wolfer, Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil
Under CERCLA: To Control or Not to Control-Which is the Answer?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 975 (1991);
John J. Little, Towards Respect for Corporate Separateness in Defining the Reach of CERCLA Liability,
44 Sw. L.J. 1499 (1991); Evelyn F. Heidelberg, Comment, Parent Corporation Liability Under CERCLA:
Toward a Uniform Federal Rule of Decision, 22 PAC. L.J. 854 (1991); Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D.
Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Substance Releases Under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F.L.
REV. 421 (1990) (arguing for a three part test emphasizing parent capacity to control waste practices,
exercise of that capacity, and knowledge or reason to know of waste practices); Charles E. Dadswell, Jr.,
Comment, The Corporate Entity: Is There Life After CERCLA?, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 463 (1990); Note,
Environmental Law: CERCLA Liability of Corporate Parents for Their Dissolved or Undercapitalized
Subsidiaries, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 345 (1991); Grant M. Sumsion, Note, Joslyn Manufacturing. Co. v. T.L.
James & Co., Should the Sins of the Children be Answered Upon the Heads of the Parents, 1991 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1427 (1991) (distinguishing between parent company liability and individual investor/shareholder
liability); Scott Blankenship & Barry Mandel, "Unveiled": Corporate Officer, Parent, and Successor
Liability Under CERCLA, 4 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 213 (1990); Allen Kezsbom et al., "Successor" and "Parent"
Liability for Superfund Cleanup Costs: The Evolving State of the Law, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 45 (1990);
Elizabeth A. Noonan, Note, To Pierce or Not to Pierce: When Is the Question, 638 WASH. U. L.Q. 733
(1990); Julie Mendel, Interpreting "Owner" and "Operator" Liability Under CERCLA, 38 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEmP. L. 229 (1990); Tom McMahon & Katie Moertl, The Erosion of Traditional Corporate
Law Doctrines in Environmental Cases, 3 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 29 (1988); Anne D. Weber, Note, Misery
Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1469 (1989); Note, Liability
of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1986) (arguing
that the reasons for limited liability favor broad CERCLA liability for cleanups).
Yale Journal on Regulation
parents are typically found liable whenever they have been directly involved
in the subsidiary's disposal of waste. However, some recent cases have
articulated standards that may indicate the eroding of this distinction.
The frequency of parent-subsidiary cases is not surprising, given the usual
de facto control of parent corporations and the artificial nature of modern large
corporate structures. Indeed, the modem large business enterprise is usually
made up of numerous controlled corporations, often with more than one tier
of corporate ownership. The corporate structure of an enterprise is chosen'
primarily as part of a business strategy rather than as a reflection 6f any
meaningful business separation of the constituent corporate parts. 2 Despite
often being part of the same business enterprise, these separate corporations are
separate legal entities with potentially separate legal liabilities. Further, parents
typically offer deeper pockets, and siblings, at a minimum, offer more pockets.
Although it is not surprising that there have been frequent attempts to
extend cleanup liability to corporate parents and some attempts to reach
siblings, it is surprising that claimants have been successful in this pursuit.
Protection of shareholders, including parent company shareholders, from
liability is a fundamental principle of the legal system and, in the customary
jargon of the common law, parent liability is to be imposed only in exceptional
cases. 13 The two legal theories of statutory interpretation and "piercing the
veil" have been at the center of these cases. In most of the cases applying the
statutory interpretation theory, courts have been willing to interpret the statute
to find parents directly liable as owners, operators, or generators 4 of waste.
However, some of the same courts, as well as others, have emphasized the idea
of limited liability and have had substantial difficulty applying the second
theory, piercing the veil, to find liability of corporate parents. Corporate parents
have sometimes defeated liability based upon the piercing the veil theory, but
have almost always been held liable on the statutory interpretation theory.
The discussion in this Part will be organized by these two legal theories.
These theories have dominated the courts' thinking in this area, and the
distinction between the theories has been important in articulating the rationale
for liability.
12. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG & KURT A. STRASSER, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW SPECIFICALLY APPLYING ENTERPRISE
PRINCIPLES xliii-I (Little,.Brown & Co. 1992); BLUMBERO, supra note 11, at xxxix-xivi.
13. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT AND OTHER COMMON
LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 137-53 (Little,
Brown & Co. 1987).
14. "Generators" is used here to describe parties whose operations give rise to hazardous waste for
which they "arrange for disposal" in CERCLA terms. See CERCLA § 9607(a)(3). The term "generator"
comes from the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulatory scheme for hazardous waste
disposal.
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A. Statutory Interpretation Cases
As discussed above, CERCLA extends liability to owners and operators of
waste disposal sites, as well as to generators of waste who arrange for disposal.
All three of these statutory categories have been interpreted to hold the parent
of the specific corporate actor liable for cleanup. The cases finding liability,
or potential liability, typically discuss both of the common liability principles.
Thus, most are concerned with both the extent of general parent company
control over subsidiary business operations, as well as the specific parent
company involvement in waste disposal and pollution control matters.
One of the first opinions to find parent company liability, State of Idaho
v. Bunker Hill Co.,'5 emphasized both factors. In this case, parent company
control over the subsidiary was substantial, going well beyond mere designation
of the subsidiary's directors. Specifically, the parent required the subsidiary to
receive parent approval before making any pollution control expenditures that
exceeded $500. All capital expenditures also required parent approval; the
parent could overrule any management transaction or decision of the subsidiary.
Further, the parent obtained weekly reports on the subsidiary's day-to-day
management activities. They filed consolidated tax returns. Finally, the
subsidiary's authorized capital was only $1,100 although it had paid $27 million
in dividends to the parent between 1968 and 1974.
It is significant that, even with this highly integrated corporate group, the
court also looked specifically to the parent's involvement with the subsidiary's
waste operations. The court concluded that the parent could also be held as an
owner or operator under CERCLA because it was "intimately familiar" with
the subsidiary's hazardous waste disposal and releases and had the "capacity.
to make decisions and implement actions and mechanisms to prevent and
abate the damage."' 16 Control over general business operations, combined with
the knowledge and potential control over waste disposal operations, was
sufficient to find owner or operator liability. The court did not discuss whether
either aspect alone would have been sufficient.
Both aspects of parent involvement and control were also discussed in
Rockwell International Corp. v. IU International Corp.,"7 although the general
business control principle was more emphasized. In that case, the parent hired
or approved hiring of certain subsidiary officers, some of whom were also
parent company officers, and determined their responsibilities. For example,
parent company executives established procedures and approved operating plans
for the facility in question and monitored the facility's compliance with these
15. 635 F. Supp. 665, 670-71 (D. Idaho 1986) (alternate holding).
16. Id. at 671-72.
17. 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. 111. 1988).
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plans. Further, the parent publicly announced that it operated the facility.
Although not emphasized in its opinion, the court also noted the substantial
parent involvement with the waste generation and disposal operations. Parent
company auditors and accountants suggested changes in procedures that directly
affected the disposal of hazardous substances. These parent employers also
reviewed subsidiary requests to purchase environmental protection equipment.
In United States v. Kayser-Roth, 8 the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed one of the first lower court opinions finding parent company
liability, and adopted its distinction between owner and operator liability. 9
It held that while owner liability was to be determined by traditional piercing
the veil standards, operator liability presented a statutory interpretation question
to be answered by considering parent control over the subsidiary's waste
management activities. Here the parent was liable as an operator because its
"active involvement" in the affairs of the subsidiary amounted to "practical
total influence and control"'2 over the subsidiary, including control over waste
disposal activities. The court noted the parent's involvement with the
subsidiary's hazardous materials, including its having made the decisions which
admitted the materials to the plant. Although the opinion emphasized the
parent's involvement with waste management, once again, both aspects of
parental control were central to the decision.
Both the ultimate corporate parent and an intermediate sub-holding company
were held liable as operators in Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co.2 The court
stated that parent liability could have been based on the fact that the parent
company "knew of and participated in efforts to ameliorate environmental
problems."22 In addition, the court found that the parent exercised general
business control over the second-tier subsidiary in its hiring, employment
compensation, and contracting. The parent also supplied legal and other
administrative services to the subsidiary. The intermediate subsidiary was held
liable as an operator because it had effective day-to-day control over the
second-tier subsidiary, exercised through the management services it provided.
The court noted that permitting such an intermediate subsidiary to insulate the
parent from liability would substantially frustrate CERCLA's remedial purposes.
Two other cases found parent company liability on statutory interpretation
grounds, but also would have found liability on traditional piercing the veil
18. 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991).
19. The lower court opinion is at 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989).
20. 910 F.2d at 27 (citing United States v. Kayser-Roth Co., 724 F. Supp. at 18).
21. No. 83-C-2385, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,254, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,578 (D. Colo.
1987). Accord Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1248 (D.N.J. 1991) (denying defendant's
motion for summary judgment); United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., Nos. 83-5896-FMS, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11,695 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 1990) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
22. 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,254, at *4.
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standards, as discussed in Section B infra. City of New York v. Exxon" is one
of the rare cases finding a parent company liable as a generator or transporter
who arranged for disposal,' rather than as an owner or operator. However,
the court emphasized that similar policies applied to interpreting "arranged for
disposal" as those implicated in interpreting "owner or operator" to establish
parent company liability. The court focused on the parent company's close
supervision of the subsidiary's business in general,' as well as its specific
involvement with the subsidiary's waste generating activities.26 Making a
strong factual conclusion, it granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding
that reasonable jurors would conclude that liability must follow from the
parent's involvement.
In the second of these two cases, United States v. Nicolet,27 the court
found that sufficient facts had been alleged to support the plaintiffs liability
claims based on either statutory interpretation of definitions of owner and
operator or by piercing the veil standards of liability. In the statutory
interpretation finding of potential parent liability, the court first made an
analogy to the shareholder liability cases which impose liability on a
shareholder who directly participates in the management of the site at issue.2"
Second, the court found liability could be based on the parent's involvement
with waste disposal practices and its benefit from those practices.2 9 Third, the
court was willing to base the parent company's liability on the fact that it held
a mortgage on the subsidiary's property and participated in the facility's
management, analogizing the situation to a lender liability case.3" The first and
third of these theories, in particular, have the potential to lead to quite broad
parent company liability if generally adopted, for they appear to premise
potential liability on parent company conduct that is typical in many integrated
corporate groups.
Particularly close parent supervision and control over the subsidiary
provided the basis for operator liability of two parent company defendants in
CPC International, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp.3 The parent companies of
both the current and past owners of the site had shared officers and directors
with the subsidiary and had been directly involved in both its major decision-
23. 112 B.R. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(3), (4) (1988).
25. 112 B.R. at 549-50.
26. Id. at 550-52.
27. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
28. The court, in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, did not discuss the specific facts
of direct parent company participation in the management. Id. at 1202-03. Individual shareholder liability
is discussed in Part 11 infra.
29. 712 F. Supp. at 1203-04. The court did not discuss the specific facts of parent company involvement
with the subsidiary's waste disposal.
30. Lender liability is discussed in Part III infra.
31. 777 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
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making and its day-to-day operations. Further, parent company employees were
found to have been directly involved in the subsidiary's waste handling
operations by formulating the subsidiary's policy, controlling these activities,
and overseeing the policy's implementation. These activities, taken together,
made each parent defendant an "active operator" rather than an "interested
investor,"32 and thus liable under CERCLA. As discussed below, the court
applied a veil-piercing analysis to determine owner liability for each of the two
parent defendants.
United States v. McGraw-Edison" illustrates the point that it is parent
company behavior, rather than mere status as a shareholder, that leads to
liability. As discussed in Part IV' individual shareholder liability has typically
been denied when sought on the basis of shareholding alone. Here, a 49% joint
venturer was held potentially liable for the subsidiary's cleanup liability. The
51% joint venture owner had settled this CERCLA claim. The complaint
alleged that the 49%-owning joint venturer had provided technical expertise and
shared one officer with the joint venture. The court held these facts sufficient
to defeat the 49% joint venturer's motion for summary judgment. If a 49%-
owning joint venturer is potentially liable, presumably liability must be based
on conduct rather than ownership alone.
One case offers a clear contrast to the statutory interpretation approach that
normally supports parent company liability. Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T. L.
James & Co."5 emphasized the fundamental common law policy of corporate
separateness in refusing to find the parent liable on either statutory
interpretation grounds or by piercing the veil. On the issue of statutory
interpretation, the court presumed that Congress intended to follow the
fundamental common law principle of limited liability because of the statute's
failure to expressly say otherwise. "Without an express Congressional directive
to the contrary, common-law principles of Corporation law, such as limited
liability, govern our court's analysis."36 This interpretation is based on the
presumed preference of Congress to apply common law principles of limited
liability, rather than to interpret congressional intent from specific statutory
language, legislative history, or the underlying regulatory policy of CERCLA.
In contrast to the opinions discussed above, the Joslyn Manufacturing opinion
used common law categories, rather than an interpretation of Congress's chosen
32. Id. at 573, 578-79.
33. 718 F. Supp. 154 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
34. See infra Part I], and infra note 65 for cases where shareholder liability was unsuccessfully sought,
based on the fact of shareholding alone.
35. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1108 (1991).
36. 893 F.2d at 83. Donald B. Mitchell, Jr., Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T. L. James & Co., Inc.:
Integrating CERCLA with the American Common-Law Tradition, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 53 (1992) argues
that the opinion's common law emphasis is the proper doctrinal basis for unifying all CERCLA law. The
author was lead counsel for the successful defendant, T. L. James & Co.
504
Vol. 10: 493, 1993
CERCLA Liability
regulatory policy, to fill the statutory silence on parent company liability. The
court also emphasized the fact that the parent did not exercise day-to-day
control.37 Several recent opinions have sought to limit Joslyn Manufacturing
by confining it to claims of owner liability and then basing more expansive
liability on an interpretation of "operator."3
In two cases, courts found parents not liable as operators because of their
minimal involvement with the subsidiary's operations. In one, the parent
corporation, Tufts College, had never participated directly in the management
of a company it had acquired mostly by testamentary bequest.39 In the second,
the parent owned the subsidiary for only one day as part of a complex purchase
of some business assets, and the parent's sole involvement was to vote to
liquidate the subsidiary.40 A clearer case of minimal involvement is difficult
to imagine. By emphasizing the limited parent involvement in the subsidiary's
operations as grounds for a finding of no liability, these two cases implicitly
support the principle of liability for actively managing parents.
With the exception of Joslyn Manufacturing, these cases, taken together,
support the general principle that liability determinations will be based on an
evaluation of the parent's general business control over the subsidiary, as well
as the parent's specific involvement with the subsidiary's waste and pollution
control activities. In doing so, these cases do not express new or radical
corporation law.4 Parent company liability often turns on the extent of its
involvement with the subsidiary's business. These cases present rather easy fact
patterns that illustrate corporate law's adaptation to CERCLA; either there is
substantial parent involvement, and hence liability, as in Bunker Hill, Rockwell,
Kayser-Roth, Idarado Mining, Exxon, and Nicolet, or very little involvement
and no liability, as in Jacksonville Electric Authority and Boston Gas.42 A
more difficult case might involve a parent that is not directly involved with and
does not closely supervise a subsidiary, but does have the power to control it
37. The facts central to conventional piercing the veil analysis were also discussed.
38. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24 (1st. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084
(1991); Mobay Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1248 (D.N.J. 1991) (denying defendant's motion
for summary judgment); United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., Nos. 83-5896-FMS, 83-5898-FMS, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11,695 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 1990) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
39. Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Eppinger & Russell Co., 776 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1991). The court
also applied traditional piercing the veil law to find no owner liability under CERCLA.
40. John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F. Supp. 435 (D. Mass. 1991).
41. Oswald & Schipan, supra note 11, at 263.
42. Three recent, careful studies of the cases broadly agree. Oswald & Schipani, supra note 11, at 302,
conclude that regardless of the theory of liability, active participation of the parent in the violation is present
whenever liability is found. Stewart & Campbell, supra note 11, at 9-10, note that rationales of cases
diverge, with some basing liability on parent capacity to control and some only on the exercise of control,
although all the cases finding liability, in fact, presented extensive parent control over subsidiary business
operations. Kezsbom et al., supra note 11, at 74 conclude:
As in most cases, it should be expected that the specific conduct of'the parties including, in
particular, their waste disposal practices and attitude toward compliance, the extent of the parent's
actual involvement in the affairs of the subsidiary, and the ability of the subsidiary to make
independent decisions, will remain factors that will impact the court's actual decision.
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and exercises the power loosely. Yet, even such a case likely would lead to
liability. The rationales used in deciding the above cases emphasize strongly
the remedial purposes of CERCLA. These purposes call for quite broad parent
liability, even where a parent chooses, as a business management strategy, not
to exert day-to-day control over all the subsidiaries in its enterprise.4 3
B. "Piercing the Veil" Liability Theory
In asserting liability of parent companies, plaintiffs counsel frequently
raises both statutory interpretation and piercing the veil theories, and the same
case must often decide the applicability of each. However, the two theories
often receive different treatment; the results of CERCLA cases using a piercing
the veil theory of liability have been more mixed." While many courts, indeed
a majority that have considered the issue, have been willing to find veil-piercing
liability, several have declined to do so. Nevertheless, many of the cases
refusing veil-piercing liability have found liability on statutory interpretation
grounds, effectively undercutting parent company protection while affirming
it in principle.
Unlike the statutory interpretation holdings, piercing the veil holdings
requires an initial determination of whether state law principles or federal
common law principles should apply. Such a decision turns on the need for
national uniformity-a need which obviously exists under CERCLA:
In attempting to eliminate the dangers of hazardous wastes, CERCLA
presents a national solution to a nationwide problem. One can hardly
imagine a federal program more demanding of national uniformity than
environmental protection. Congress did not intend that the ability of the
executive to fund the cleanup of hazardous waste sites should depend
on the attitudes of the several states toward parent-subsidiary liability
in general, or CERCLA in particular. The need for a uniform federal
rule is especially great for questions of piercing the corporate veil, since
liability under the statute must not depend on the particular state in
which a defendant happens to reside. 45
43. See BLUMBERG, supra note 11, at ch. 18, for a general discussion of the application of enterprise
principles in environmental law.
The court in Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Eppinger & Russell Co., 776 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1991),
found no present liability, emphasizing that the parent and subsidiary were in totally unrelated businesses,
and, as such, were not part of one integrated enterprise.
44. This is also true of the officer, director, and shareholder liability cases. See infra Part H.
45. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987).
Other CERCLA liability cases in accord are collected in BLUMBERG, supra note 11, at 615 n.12 and
BLUMBERG & STRASSER, 1992 SUPPLEMENT, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: STATUTORY
LAW---GENERAL (1992).
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While courts in a few shareholder liability cases have apparently applied
state law on this question,46 courts in the vast majority of parent liability cases
have expressed a preference for a uniform federal common law.'
Nevertheless, the difference may be more one of analytic rather than practical
significance.
The emerging federal law draws heavily on the state law for guidance,8
and, in any event, the state law is typically not sufficiently precise to mandate
a particular result in any given case. Several cases have found parent company
liability by applying federal common law that resembles traditional state
piercing the veil law. In an alternative holding, the court in City !f New York
v. Exxon49 pierced the corporate veil, emphasizing the parent's involvement
in and pervasive control over the subsidiary's business activities, the lack of
observance of corporate formalities, integrated financing of the parent and
subsidiary, as well as the parent's awareness of the subsidiary's pollution
dumping activities.
United States v. Kayser-Roth"° held that owner liability' was to be
determined by piercing the veil law, although the facts it emphasized to justify
liability were largely those that also justified operator liability under a statutory
interpretation theory. Piercing the veil was apparently used in Gopher Oil Co.
v. Union Oil of California5 to find parent liability. Although the court did not
specify the legal theory of liability, it emphasized the parent's control over the
subsidiary and the fraud perpetrated on the plaintiff when the defendant parent
misrepresented the contaminated property during sales negotiations.
United States v. Nicolet52 reinterpreted the standards for veil piercing under
CERCLA in the course of finding liability. The new standard comes close to
merging the veil piercing and statutory interpretation theories of liability:
Where a subsidiary is or was at the relevant time a member of one of
the classes of persons potentially liable under CERCLA; and the parent
had a substantial financial or ownership interest in the subsidiary; and
the parent corporation controls or at the relevant time controlled the
46. See, e.g., CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 574 (W.D. Mich. 1991); New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699-700 (D.S.C. 1984).
47. See authorities cited supra note 45.
48. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Acushnet River, 675 F.
Supp. at 33.
49. 112 B.R. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
50. 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991). AccordCPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-
General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (apparently applying state law standards). Jacksonville
Elec. Auth. v. Eppinger & Russell Co., 776 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (applying federal veil-piercing
standards to its unusual facts to find no owner liability).
51. 757 F. Supp. 988 (D. Minn. 1990).
52. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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management and operations of the subsidiary, the parent's separate
corporate existence may be disregarded. 53
Under this standard, the same facts would lead to CERCLA liability under
either a statutory interpretation or a veil-piercing theory, undercutting any
distinction between the two.
The court significantly modified the traditional piercing the veil analysis
in this reformulation by leaving out any consideration of undercapitalization,
fraud, inequitable conduct, or observance of separate corporate formalities. The
widespread adoption of this new standard would result in the frequent
imposition .of parent company liability wherever courts find the parent
controlled the subsidiary's "management and operations." This standard was
the basis for an alternative holding, and the court was clearly prepared to base
liability on statutory interpretation, if needed. These factors may well have
influenced the court's adoption of such a substantial change in legal doctrine.
In almost direct contrast stands Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T. L. James
& Co.' The court not only refused to assign liability based on the statutory
interpretation theory, as discussed above, but it applied a traditional test to deny
veil-piercing liability. The parent and subsidiary's separateness were established
by the observance of corporate formalities, separate employees and officers,
separate property ownership, tax returns, bill paying, and employee benefits
payments.5 5 "Veil piercing should be .limited to situations in which the
corporate entity is used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud or avoid personal
liability." 56 This high standard was simply not met under the facts of Joslyn
Manufacturing. Although the facts were different in the two cases, Joslyn
Manufacturing provides a quite different legal standard from the expansive one
articulated in Nicolet.
Joslyn Manufacturing aside, most courts that have not found liability under
traditional veil-piercing analysis have found liability on some other grounds.57
As a result, the parent company protection offered in a restrictive veil-piercing
holding is more apparent than real; presumably, parents will be more concerned
with being liable under CERCLA than with the particular theory upon which
liability is based.
53. Id. at 1202.
54. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1108 (1991).
55. 893 F.2d at 83.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., In re Southern Timber Prods., Inc., No. 87-13-R, RCRA (3008) appeal No. 89-2, 1990
RCRA LEXIS 22 (EPA Nov. 13, 1990). There is, however, an interesting exception to this general rule.
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proc., 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987), United States v. Bliss,
108 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1985), and Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo.
1985), all refused to pierce the veil to find jurisdiction over absent parents in CERCLA litigation. United
States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,592 (E.D. Pa. 1989) denied discovery of facts
needed to support a "piercing the veil" theory because that theory had not been pleaded.
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Although both the legal rules and their application are less certain in
piercing the veil holdings than in statutory interpretation holdings, even the
former offers some support for our thesis. In deciding whether to pierce the
veil, courts look to the extent of the parent company's control over and
involvement with the subsidiary's business generally, and its specific
involvement with the subsidiary's hazardous substance handling operations."8
However, the vast common law jurisprudence that has developed around veil
piercing also finds its way into some of these cases, so that the observance of
corporate formalities, undercapitalization, and fraud, among others, influence
the courts' analysis at times. Although these facts would not be irrelevant in
the statutory interpretation opinions in certain courts, these traditional common
law standards may receive greater emphasis in deciding whether to pierce the
veil. Courts further complicate the situation by applying different veil-piercing
tests. Application of the Nicolet standard makes the veil-piercing inquiry
virtually indistinguishable from statutory interpretation. On the other hand, the
more traditional Joslyn Manufacturing standard makes liability much harder to
find. Of course, the ready availability of alternative theories of liability
undercuts the significance of any differences between them.
II. Individual Corporate Officers, Directors, and Shareholders
Plaintiffs often seek to extend liability to corporate officers, directors, and
even shareholders.59 While such claims may reflect CERCLA's endless search
for more and deeper pockets, they may also rest on a stronger basis. Courts
have found that individual corporate actors who had some degree of
responsibility for hazardous substances which have now created environmental
problems, or threaten to create them, are appropriate liability targets under
CERCLA, both to fund needed cleanups, and to discourage improper behavior
58. See discussion and authorities, supra, notes 40 & 41.
59. There is a large and growing law review literature on this topic. In addition to the articles cited
in note 11, supra, see Kathryn R. Heidt, Liability of Shareholders Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 133 (1991); William Scott Biel, Comment,
Whistling Past the Waste Site: Directors' and Officers Personal Liability for Environmental Decisions and
the Rule of Liability Insurance Coverage, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 241 (1991); Elizabeth A. G. Geitman,
Shareholder Liability for Improper Disposal of Hazardous Waste, 95 COM. L.J. 385 (1990); Perry E.
Wallace, Jr., Liability of Corporations and Corporate Officers, Directors, and Shareholders Under
Superfund: Should Corporate and Agency Law Concepts Apply?, 14 J. CORP. L. 839 (1989); Carroll E.
Dubuc & William D. Evans, Jr., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Chemical Co., Inc.: The
Eighth Circuit Unleashes a CERCLA Dragnet on Corporate Officials, 24 TORT & INs. L.J. 168 (1988);
David A. Rich, Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of CERCLA Section 107,
13 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 643 (1986); David W. Tunderman, Personal Liability for Corporate Directors,
Officers, Employees and Controlling Shareholders Under State and Federal Environmental Laws, 31 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. ch. 2 (1985); Andrew M. Goldberg, Comment, Corporate Officer Liability for Federal
Environmental Statute Violations, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 357 (1991); Thomas J. Niekamp, Note,
Individual Liability of Corporate Officers, Directors and Shareholders for Violations of Environmental Laws,
14 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 379 (1987).
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in the future. The key is to identify the degree of responsibility for business
operations, and the degree of involvement in them, that can result in liability.
After a brief review of the legal theories of liability, this Part will identify
lessons to be learned from the results and rationales of the cases, regarding the
level of personal involvement in a business that may lead to liability.
Cases can be brought against individual officers, directors, or shareholders
under one or more of three legal theories. First, plaintiffs can seek a broad
interpretation of CERCLA's statutory terms-"owner," "operator," or
"generator"--to reach individual defendants. CERCLA's basic remedial policies
and its endless search for deep pockets will support its long arm here, as shown
in earlier Parts of this Article.' ° Second, many plaintiffs have been successful
in applying traditional tort corporate law doctrines which hold individual
corporate actors liable for corporate torts in which they "actively
participate."'" Third, plaintiffs may resort to the traditional piercing the veil
theory. Attempts to impose liability on individuals by piercing the corporate
veil have been generally less successful, although these cases typically do find
liability on other grounds.62
Whatever the legal theory, analysis of these cases turns on the type of
individual behavior that can lead to liability. Several recent cases, all concerned
with individual shareholders of closely held companies, generally confirm the
principle that stock ownership by an individual, without more, will not provide
a basis for finding owner liability.6 3 Similarly, no court has found director
liability based solely on the performance of traditional director's duties; more
personal involvement by directors in management activities has always been
required.6' In emphasizing that shareholder and director liability turns on
individual behavior, these cases indirectly support the principle that CERCLA
liability will turn on each individual's participation in managing the business
60. See Introduction and Part I, supra.
61. For a discussion of these traditional tort theories, see, for example, 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1137 (perm. ed. 1986); H. HENN. & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS § 230 at 608 n.5 (3d ed. 1983); BLUMBERO, supra note 11, at § 18.02.2.
62. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Mottolo,
629 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.H. 1984). In contrast, piercing the veil liability was found as an alternative holding
in United States v. Carolawn Co., [1984] 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984),
although the court was also willing to find liability for the individual's participation in the conduct that
violated the statute.
63. See Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Seymour Freedman, 790 F. Supp. 383 (D. Conn. 1992) (inactive
shareholder and officer defendants granted summary judgment); CBS, Inc. v. Henkin, 803 F. Supp. 1462
(N.D. Ind. 1992) (inactive shareholder defendant granted summary judgment); Robertshaw Controls Co.
v. Watts Regulator Co., 807 F. Supp. 144 (D. Me. 1992); Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg.
Prods. Inc., No. 88-5317, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6375 (E.D. La. May 22, 1990), affd, 931 F.2d 327 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 636 (1991); Amcast Ind. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., No. S88-620, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15191 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 12, 1990); Columbia River Serv. v. Gilman, 751 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Wash.
1990); United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989). Cf. United
States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989), affd, 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992).
See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 11, at 297-99.
64. Oswald & Schipani, supra note 11, at 273.
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and handling its wastes. Further, the cases now clearly require that an officer
must have engaged in the liability-creating conduct at the time that storage or
disposal took place for liability to attach under an operator theory; officers who
control the company only at a later time will not be liable.
65
In general, the rules and results of the cases establish three categories of
individual behavior-three points of focus for the factual inquiry-that may
lead to liability.6 6 The first category looks to the authority of an individual
to control the waste disposal activities of the business. Typically, this authority
is inferred from the general business management and supervisory activities of
the individual. The second point of focus looks to the individual's personal
involvement with waste-handling and disposal management. The third category
looks to an individual's ability to prevent harm from improper waste activities.
A. Control of the Business and its Wastes
Two early cases established the fundamental principle in favor of liability
for the general managers and supervisors of the business. This basic principle
states that those who manage the business must also take care in managing its
wastes. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO)67 ultimately held Michaels, the corporate president and a major
stockholder, liable for cleanup costs. The federal district court in Missouri
found that Michaels's direct involvement in waste disposal practices justified
owner or operator liability.68 Because Michaels had not actually owned the
facility, the Court of Appeals reversed this determination, instead imposing
liability on him because he had arranged for disposal of the wastes.69 Noting
that "the authority to control the handling and disposal of hazardous substances
... is critical under the statutory scheme," the court gave what has become a
widely quoted statement of basic policy favoring individual liability:
[C]onstruction of CERCLA to impose liability upon only the
corporation and not the individual corporate officers and employees who
are responsible for making corporate decisions about the handling and
65. See Nurad v. Win. E. Hager & Sons Co., 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,079 (D. Md. 1991),
affid on other grounds, 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub. norn. Mumaw v. Nurad, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
377 (1992); Quadion Corp. v. Mache, No. 891.3536, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8222 (N.D. 111. June 11, 1991);
Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., No. 871799-T, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17,284 (D. Mass. Nov.
25, 1991).
66. This three part distinction is a modified version of the analysis of Oswald and Schipani, supra note
11, at 273-97.
67. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
68. Id. at 849.
69. 810 F.2d at 743. See United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 897 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (imposing
liability on president/principal shareholder "regardless of the knowing involvement of the generator of
hazardous wastes.").
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disposal of hazardous substances would open an enormous, and clearly
unintended, loophole in the statutory scheme. 70
Applying this basic policy, the court found individual liability, even though
the defendant had no personal involvement in the decisions about hazardous
substances. It was enough that, as president and a major shareholder, he
generally managed the business: "Michaels was the individual in charge of and
directly responsible for all of NEPACCO'S operations ... and he had ultimate
authority to control the disposal of NEPACCO'S hazardous substances."71
This case strongly supports the idea that those who manage the business must
also take responsibility for managing its wastes.
A previous case, New York v. Shore Realty Corp.72 articulated this same
basic policy. Here the sole shareholder and corporate officer, who effectively
exercised the day-to-day management of the business, was held liable for
CERCLA cleanup costs. Liability was based on his active conduct in managing
the business rather than on personal involvement with the associated cleanup
obligations. The court concluded that the sole shareholder/officer was an owner
or operator, relying on the legislative history of CERCLA which underscored
the judicial policy of broadly construing remedial environmental statutes such
as CERCLA.73 However, the court specifically declined to pierce the corporate
veil to attach liability. The court strictly applied New York law and found that
some separation between the shareholder and his corporation had been
maintained.74The difficulty with the principle that individual liability will attach to those
with general supervisory responsibility for the business is that it is potentially
limitless. Surely the CEO should not always have personal liability whenever
the corporate entity has any CERCLA liability, although the bare statement of
principle in these cases seems to permit it. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and
Shore Realty Corp., however, may provide some implicit guidance as to the
limits of officer liability. In both cases, the officers held liable, while company
70. 810 F.2d at 743.
71. Id. at 745. Dicta in two recent cases support a determination for individual liability on the basis
of the individual's "authority to control" waste disposal, rather than requiring personal involvement in waste
operations. Quadion Corp. v. Mache, No. 89L3536, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8222 (N.D. I1. June 11, 1991);
Nurad v. Wm. E. Hooper & Sons Co., 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,079 (D. Md. 1991), afftd, 966
F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. MuMaw v. Nurad, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
72. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
73. Id. at 1039-42, 1044-45, 1047, 1049. For the most part, RCRA cases have applied similarly
expansive policies, although this has not been universally the rule. Compare United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co. of Ill., 733 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ind. 1989) and United States v. Production Plated Plastics, Inc.,
742 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mich. 1990) with In re Southern Timber Prod., Inc., No. 87-13R RCRA (3008)
appeal No. 892, 1990 RCRA LEXIS 22 (EPA, Nov. 13, 1990).
74. 759 F.2d at 1052. See BLUMBERG, supra note 11, at § 18.02.3, nn.52-54. Shore Realty, itself, was
readily found liable as an owner of the facility. "Section 9607(a)(1) [CERCLA 107(a)(1)] unequivocally
imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility ... " New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
at 1044.
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presidents, had managed, at a level close to the actual supervision, the waste
generation and disposal activities. These were relatively small companies in
which the president might reasonably have been expected to supervise the waste
disposal operations. We will see below that at least one opinion denied
individual liability because the individual was not closely enough associated
with waste handling and disposal.
B. Individual Involvement with Waste Disposal
The second group of cases, more common in the facts and to some degree
in the courts' rationales, emphasizes the individual's specific involvement with
the waste handling and disposal activities at the company in determining
liability. General business supervision authority is also present in most of these
cases, however, there is always personal involvement in the conduct which led
to the violation.
Involvement in both the specific waste disposal activities and the general
management of the business operation were important in finding the existence
of potential individual liability to withstand a motion for summary judgment
in Riverside Market Development Corp. v. International Building Products
Inc.15 Von Dohlen, the president and 15% shareholder, was found potentially
liable as an operator under CERCLA. He spent about 40% of his time at the
factory in question and was actively involved in general management, product
design, and facilities acquisition, as well as in waste disposal and the sale of
the asbestos products that generated the troublesome waste.76 However, the
court found no operator liability for another individual, Prescott, despite the fact
that he owned 85% of the stock and was chairman of the board. His actual
involvement in the management of the business was minimal. He spent little
time at the plant, did not live in the same part of the country, and participated
only by reviewing financial information and attending directors' meetings and
an annual gathering which included customers.77 The Court of Appeals, while
75. Riverside Mkt Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prod. Inc., No. 88-5317, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6375 (E.D. La. May 22, 1990), affd, 931 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 636 (1991). See
United States v. Amtreco, 809 F. Supp. 959 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment); United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech., Inc., Civ. No. 91-809 (CSF), 1992 WL 33845 (D.N.J.
Feb. 18, 1992) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment); Construction Corp. v. Williams, 785
F. Supp. 271 (D.N.H. 1991) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
76. The District Court detailed Von Dohlen's activities in 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6375, at *5-7.
77. The District Court's detailed statement of Preston's activities is in 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6375,
at *5.
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noting his lack of managerial involvement generally, particularly emphasized
that he had no personal involvement in the conduct that violated CERCLA:
The record clearly indicates that Prescott spent very little time at the
asbestos plant [the facility in question], and no evidence has been
presented to indicate that such visits would have provided Prescott with
the opportunity to direct or personally participate in the improper
disposal of asbestos or asbestos by-products.7"
Based on these facts, the court granted summary judgment for Prescott.
Two cases have found CERCLA liability for individual corporate actors
who actively managed the corporations' commercial waste disposal facilities.
United States v. Carolawn Co.7 9 upheld the potential liability of three
individual controlling shareholders and officers for their participation in the
misconduct, finding that "personal liability of corporate officials who are
responsible for the day-to-day operations of a hazardous waste business"' was
contemplated by CERCLA. The court also refused to dismiss the piercing the
veil claim.8'
Owner and operator liability was found, based on similar facts, in United
States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co. 2 This case concerned the liability of
Pierce, the president and majority shareholder of the company that owned the
storage tanks and conducted the waste storage operations at issue when
hazardous substance releases occurred. The court found him liable noting:
As president of [the company] during the relevant time period, Pierce
was in charge of and directly responsible for all of the [company's]
operations and, hence, possessed ultimate authority to control the
disposal of the hazardous substances. Therefore, as owner and operator
at the time of the disposal of the hazardous waste at the Mexico site,
Jack Pierce is liable under CERCLA.8 3
78. 931 F.2d at 330.
79. United States v. Carolawn Co., [1984], 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698 (D.S.C. June 15,
1984).
80. Id. at 20,699. See United States v. Mirabile, [19851 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1511 (E.D. Pa. June
6, 1985) (upholding potential liability of the individual who was both the chairman and a major stockholder,
who "directed, controlled and managed" the operations which deposited the wastes and "had the capacity
and opportunity to control the disposal of the waste.") Id. at 1512.
81. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,699.
82. 764 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Mo. 1991); 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,486 (E.D. Mo. May 16,
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 980 F.2d 478 (4th Cir. 1992).
83. Id. at 16. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), affd, 901
F.2d 1550(llth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) (holding sole shareholders who also managed
the business liable under CERCLA, despite the claim that the lender intervened to take over the management
of the hazardous waste and thus was an intervening cause). For a discussion of lender liability, see Part In
infra.
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Similarly, two opinions in United States v. Mottolo8 support liability of
corporate officials directly involved in managing waste disposal operations. The
first opinion found the individuals potentially liable because of their
participation in the tort, and thus denied their motion for summary judgment;
interestingly, the court also applied a strict piercing the veil test that was not
satisfied.8" The second opinion articulated a revised piercing test that
emphasized the remedial goals of CERCLA over the importance of the common
law's respect for the corporate form.86 Despite the merits of such an enterprise
approach to liability, it has not been widely adopted in the CERCLA cases, no
doubt because other theories of liability have proven so serviceable.
United States v. Carolina Transformer Co." introduced a distinction
between owner and operator liability for individuals who have a direct
involvement in the waste operations of a company. In this case, the sole
shareholder, also a former director, president, and chairman, who had actively
participated in the business, was held liable as both an owner and an operator.
Another defendant, also a former president and director who had been active
in the business, was held liable only as an operator. Both had supervised the
day-to-day operations, including operations involving toxic substances, and both
had been involved in the corporation's refusal to comply with the EPA orders.
The distinction between owner liability and operator liability, in this instance,
can only have been based on stock ownership, although the opinion simply does
not say whether owner liability could have been based on stock ownership
alone. Because the case presented egregious misconduct by a closely held
corporation, and this misconduct was central to the liability findings, the
distinction it draws between owner and operator liability on the basis of
shareholding should be used cautiously.
Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Electric Co.8 demonstrates the limits
of basing liability on personal involvement with waste disposal operations. It
84. 629 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.H. 1984); 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988).
85. 629 F. Supp. at 59-60 (participation and direct causal relation to the injury led to potential liability).
86. 695 F. Supp. at 624. "In applying this rule [concerning separate corporate entities] with respect
to federal statutes, the Court looks closely 'at the purpose of the federal statute to determine whether the
statute places importance on the corporate form, an inquiry that usually gives less respect to the corporate
form than does the strict common law alter ego doctrine."' Id. (quoting Alman v. Damin, 801 F.2d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 1986)). Strict respect for the corporate form here, the court noted, would undermine the CERCLA
"polluter pays" principle.
87. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989), aft'd, 978 F.2d
832 (4th Cir. 1992).
88. No. 87-1799-T, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17,284 (D. Mass. Nov. 25, 1991). See Levin Metals Corp.
v. Parr-Richmond Co., 781 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
[T]his court holds that an individual cannot be liable as an operator under CERCLA Section
107(a)(2) unless that individual actively participates in the operation of the facility at which
hazardous substances are disposed of, exercises control over the company immediately responsible
for the operation of the facility, or is otherwise intimately involved in that company's operations.
Id. at 1457. Applying this standard, the court granted the summary judgment motion of the defendant who
had been a minority shareholder, director, and officer of the company, but had never been involved in waste
disposal operations and had had only minimal involvement with the overall operations. Id. at 1458.
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held that the corporate officers were not liable because they did not participate
in the conduct that violated CERCLA. The officers in question did not take
over management of the company until four years after the production and
storage of the wastes at issue had ceased. To "hold an officer liable... he must
have personally participated in the conduct that violated CERCLA."' 9 This
rationale appears to be in direct conflict with the reasoning expressed in the
cases discussed in Section A of this Part. But a close examination of the facts
in each group of cases shows, as demonstrated here, that the competing
rationales merely fall along different points on a continuum. While the court's
focus here was on the individual's lack of involvement with waste disposal, the
facts show an equal absence of involvement with general business management
at the time the wastes were improperly stored.
C. Capacity to Prevent Harm
The third group of cases, consisting mainly of three opinions from Judge
Enslen of the Western District of Michigan, find individual liability under
CERCLA where the individual could have prevented the hazardous waste
problem, but did not. These three opinions emphasized the individual's
responsibilities and actions in preventing or ameliorating the hazardous waste
problem as a key to determining liability.9° The first factor of Judge Enslen's
two factor analysis considered the authority of an individual to control the
business of the discharging company, especially the waste handling practices.
As one moves up the corporate hierarchy, there is greater responsibility to
insure compliance with the law although, as a practical matter, there is likely
to be less direct contact with specific waste handling operations." Second, the
court considered the "responsibility undertaken for waste disposal practices,
including evidence of responsibility undertaken and neglected, as well as
affirmative attempts to prevent unlawful hazardous waste disposal."9" Taken
together, these two factors maintain the focus on an individual's general
management responsibility and her specific responsibility for hazardous waste
demonstrated in previous sections.
89. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17,284.
90. Kelley v. Arco Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-20 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Kelley v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1543-44 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp.
1554, 1562 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
91. Dale A. Oesterl's, Viewing CERCLA as Creating an Option on the Marginal Firm: Does it
Encourage Irresponsible Environmental Behavior? 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 48 (1991) notes that the
Kelley court has moved the standard from requiring direct personal participation to a standard that includes
broadly defined forms of culpable nonfeasance: "Thus a corporation that does not have an established
corporate policy against illegal releases, backed by proper lines of authority, communication, and monitoring,
may find that its chief officers, managers, and even controlling shareholders are ... liable."
92. Kelley v. Arco Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. at 1219.
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Judge Enslen particularly emphasized that liability is to be used to
encourage prevention, distinguishing its approach from the common law:
The standard I have articulated is quite unlike the lack of corporate
formalities associated with piercing the corporate veil, and is different
from the issue of personal knowledge, direct supervision, or active
participation found in most ordinary torts by corporate actors. Here the
focus of the inquiry is whether the corporate individual could have
prevented the hazardous waste discharge at issue. . . Secondly, the
Court, in determining individual liability under § 107, will look at
responsibility undertaken for waste disposal practices as it relates to the
prevention test. Here active, direct, knowing efforts to prevent or abate
the contamination may work for-not against-a corporate defendant
where the acts suggest the individual tried but was unable to prevent
or abate the unlawful waste disposal.
9 3
While generally supportive of our principles of CERCLA liability, this
prevention test offers an additional lens to view the facts of a specific case.
However, it goes beyond the previous cases and presents an expanded liability
principle that, if generally adopted, is a substantial modification in the test, that
might also change the results of some cases.
The key to appropriate use of a prevention test is to properly appreciate its
limits. As with a focus on authority to control, this test can, in the abstract,
result in the limitless extension of liability. However, careful reading of these
opinions provides a partial response to such concerns. These were all opinions
denying summary judgment motions; they offer quite limited development of
the facts on which liability could be based, holding only that the complete
absence of such facts had not been shown at the relatively early stage of the
litigation. In addition, the opinions emphasize the need for careful, fact-sensitive
decision-making in specific cases:
Imposing liability on a corporate individual is a serious matter, and
because CERCLA provides no explicit way to distinguish among
corporate actors, the courts should respond with proper standards. Strict
liability may be too harsh and broad-sweeping a standard to apply to
all corporate "owners" [and operators] in all cases: Not all employees
or managers of a close corporation will necessarily, absent special
factors, be liable for a § 107 claim. Consequently, a more definitive
standard seems appropriate.
93. Id. at 1216. See also Kelley v. Thomas, 727 F. Supp. at 1544.
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This Court will look to evidence of an individual's authority to
control, among other things, waste handling practices-evidence such
as whether the individual holds the position of officer or director,
especially where there is a co-existing management position; distribution
of power within the corporation . . . evidence of responsibility
undertaken and neglected, as well as affirmative attempts to prevent
unlawful hazardous waste disposal. 9
In this context, the prevention principle is most usefully seen as another way
to analyze the facts, rather than a novel test for liability. It offers, however, a
useful perspective for evaluating specific facts in specific cases.
Grouping the cases into the three types of the three sections in this Part
helps to clarify distinctions and analysis. Yet resolving new cases will always
require more than simply identifying to which of these groups it belongs; a fact
sensitive analysis will always be required. As the court said in United States
v. Cordova Chemical Co.,95 denying an individual corporate actor's motion
for summary judgment:
A court must weigh a number of factors to determine an official's role
in a corporation and its polluting activities. These factors include a
corporate individual's position in the company; degree of authority;
percentage of ownership; role in board decision-making and daily
management; knowledge of and responsibility for waste disposal policy;
and personal involvement with, neglect of and ability to control
hazardous waste matters .... [A] combined assessment of all of these
factors determines whether a corporate individual should be held
personally liable under CERCLA due to involvement in hazardous waste
practices or due to neglect thereof when placed in the context of the
individual's pervasive control and active involvement over other aspects
of the company.96
94. Kelley v. Arco, 723 F. Supp. at 1219.
95. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., Nos: 1:89-CV-961, 1:89-CV-503, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4183 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 1991).
96. id. at *2, *3. See United States v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D.
Ind. 1989) (RCRA liability); Vermont v. Staco, 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988) (controlling shareholder
of parent with "ultimate authority to control" and plant manager both potentially liable under CERCLA and
RCRA). See also Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr Richmond Terminal Co., 781 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(individual who, at various times, was a minority shareholder, director, and officer of related corporations
acquiring property leased to a hazardous waste generator could not be held liable as an operator because
the individual did not participate in the lessee's operation of the facility, did not exercise control over the
lessee, and was not intimately involved in the lessee's operations).
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D. Conclusion
Claims of CERCLA liability against individual corporate actors turn on the
extent of the individual's involvement with the business. While precise and
definitive rules have not emerged, and some conflicts exist among the cases'
rationales, three points of focus for the factual inquiry can be seen. First, courts
will inquire into the extent to which the individual actively managed the
business and thus had general authority over the waste generating and handling
operations. Some cases say that those who are running the business, typically
high level corporate officers or major stockholders in closely held companies,
must insure that the company complies with CERCLA as part of their business
management responsibilities. By predicating liability on nonfeasance by those
managing the business, the language of some cases articulates a duty to act to
insure compliance. While such a rule expresses broader liability than managers
and executives have traditionally faced, it can be justified by CERCLA's
frequently stated remedial goals.
The greatest difficulty with this expanded scope of liability under CERCLA
is defining its outer limits.97 First, such a principle reaches too far; it is simply
unfair to hold top corporate officials personally liable for all corporate waste
handling activities far removed from their actual areas of direct, personal
management, as will be particularly true in large and diverse organizations. In
addition, with such liability, corporate indemnification will surely follow, at
least in large organizations, and effectively undercut the incentive effects of the
rule. However, the rule of liability expressed in these cases is qualified by their
fact patterns. The cases that have articulated a broad liability rule involved
relatively small companies managed by individuals who directly oversaw all
business operations and could reasonably be charged with checking on
hazardous substance management. Indeed, in no case has liability been imposed
on an individual whose actual management activities or responsibilities did not
have a reasonably close connection to the waste generating or disposing
operations of the company, regardless of the principle of liability expressed."
While the case law has not yet specified the outer limits of liability based on
general supervision, there is a basis for expecting that those with no connection
to, or no responsibility for, waste generation, handling, or storage will be held
liable.99
97. See William Scott Biel, Whistling Past the Waste Site: Directors' and Officers' Personal Liability
for Environmental Decisions and the Role of Liability Insurance Coverage, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 241 (1991).
98. See generally Oswald & Schipani, supra note 11, at 288, 297-99.
99. See Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1991);
Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 77 F. Supp. 1036 (D. Mass. 1991); Levin Metals Corp. v.
Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 781 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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The second point of focus is the extent to which an individual participated
in the management of hazardous substances. Liability determined by this factor
may well be found for those lower in the corporate hierarchy, those who
actually made and implemented waste disposal decisions. Once again, liability
of this nature cannot be considered wholly unanticipated in this day of extreme
public concern with toxic chemical exposure. Corporate actors who manage
waste disposal can no longer claim to be surprised that society is intensely
concerned with the proper use and disposal of hazardous substances and is
willing to punish misbehavior through the imposition of liability. In fact, this
aspect of CERCLA liability is quite similar to the traditional tort liability of
those who "actively participate" in a corporation's misconduct.
The third point of focus is the extent to which an individual could have
prevented a hazardous waste problem. This inquiry is really a modification of
the first point of focus, for they both emphasize the authority to control.
However, the third focus also implicates aspects of the second, for those closer
to actual waste handling operations will often have the best opportunity to
prevent harm. Notably, these three points of focus essentially restate our two
general principles of liability.
III. Lender Liability
Commercial lenders often become involved in the management of their
borrowers' activities, particularly when the borrower experiences financial
difficulty. While financial difficulty can result from many causes, a large
unfunded Superfund liability can certainly cause or contribute to fiscal
problems. As the lender becomes more closely involved in supervising, and
perhaps managing the borrower's operations, claims of Superfund lender
liability have followed.'00
The Superfund Amendments provide a specific exemption for lenders.
Section 9607(2)(A) excludes from "owner or operator" liability one who holds
only a security interest in a facility. This so-called "secured creditor exemption"
provides that "[the term 'owner or operator'] does not include a person, who,
without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia
of ownership primarily to protect his security, interest in the vessel or
100. See, e.g., James B. Lowery, Comment, Don't Get Involved!-How Unsuspecting Secured Creditors
May Incur Liability Under CERCLA by "Participating in the Management" of a Debtor's "Facility," 56
Mo. L. REV. 295 (1991); T. Allen McConnell, Wanted! Comprehensive Ruling on Lender Liability for
Borrowers' Hazardous Waste: A Survey of the "Secured Creditor" Exception to Liability Under CERCLA,
22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1181 (1991); Michelle B. Corash & Lawrence Behrendet, Lender Liability Under
CERCLA: Search for Safe Harbor, 43 Sw. L.J. 863 (1990); Martin R. Jelliffe, Lender Liability Under
CERCLA: A Game of Chance or a Game of Skill? II Miss. C. L. REV. 39 (1990).
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facility."'' Thus the questions of, "When do lenders become 'owners or
operators' ?", and "What constitutes 'without participating in the management'
of the facility?", become very important. The courts that have grappled with
these questions have reached varied and inconsistent results. In response, the
EPA has recently attempted to achieve specificity and certainty by promulgating
arule. 02
The court in United States v. Mirabile°3 addressed both of the above
questions. In ruling on a motion for partial summary judgment, a Pennsylvania
District Court held that the secured creditors"°' of a hazardous waste site
could be deemed owners or operators and, therefore, held liable for cleanup
costs under CERCLA. 1°5 The determinative factor for assessing liability was
whether the individual creditors had exercised control over the nuts-and-bolts
operation of the site.0 6
In Mirabile, the court evaluated the involvement of three financial
institutions at the waste site to determine whether they were "owners" or
"operators" under CERCLA, or whether they fell within the secured creditor
exemption of the statute. The American Bank and Trust Company (ABT)
loaned money to Mangels Industries, Inc., the owner of the Turco site, and
secured its loan with a mortgage on its facility. Mellon Bank provided financing
to Turco, a paint manufacturer, secured by its inventory and assets, and the
Small Business Administration (SBA) loaned money to Turco for specific debts
and secured its loan by a second lien security interest in machinery and
equipment, a second lien on inventory and accounts receivable, a second
mortgage on real estate, and a pledge of stock. 07
The court determined that ABT could not be held liable for cleanup costs
as it clearly held only a security interest in the facility, even though it did hold
formal title as a result of its foreclosure.1
0 8
[ABT's] actions with respect to the foreclosure were plainly undertaken
in an effort to protect its security interest in the property. ABT made
no effort to continue . ..operations on the property, and indeed
101. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). "Person means any individual, firm, corporation, association,
partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body," 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988), and is
therefore broad enough to encompass lending institutions.
102. 7 Fed. Reg. 18,344. See infra text accompanying notes 144-48.
103. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
104. Id. at 20,995.
105. Two of the three secured creditors involved were granted summary judgments.
106. Id.
107. The procedural posture of this case is somewhat unusual. The United States filed an action against
the present owners of the Turco site, the Mirabiles. They, in turn, joined ABT and Mellon Bank as third
party defendants. ABT and Mellon Bank counterclaimed against the SBA. Id.
108. Id. at 20,996. The court did not determine whether ABT owned both legal and equitable title to
the property, finding such a determination unnecessary for the disposition of the case relative to ABT.
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foreclosed some eight months after all operations had ceased .... The
actions undertaken by ABT with respect to the site cannot be deemed
to constitute participation in the management of the site. 09
The court went on to note that before a secured creditor may be held liable,
"it must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the
site.""' Finding no participation beyond foreclosure, the court was unwilling
to extend liability to ABT, despite ABT's ownership of the site, and despite
the court's recognition that the government would be more likely to recoup its
cleanup costs if ABT could be held accountable."' Further, unlike the court
in Kelly v. Arco Industries,"2 the Mirabile court refused to base its decision
on policy grounds. "It may well be that the imposition of [liability on secured
creditors or lending institutions] would help to ensure more responsible
management of such sites. The consideration of such policy matters, and the
decision as to the imposition of such liability, however, lies with
Congress."" 3
SBA's financing agreement with Turco contemplated some degree of
involvement in the operation of the plant."4 Pursuant to SBA regulations,
SBA was to provide management assistance to the facility, and according to
the agreement, SBA was to approve all third party contracts.' The financing
agreement also allowed SBA to restrict the facility's expenditures." 6
Consequently, SBA was authorized to become involved in the management,
the decision-making, and the day-tQ-day operations of the facility. However,
the SBA had never become so involved, and this fact was determinative in the
court's decision relieving SBA from liability. To the Mirabile court, therefore,
actual participation in the affairs of the facility, not the mere authority to do
so, was necessary before liability could attach.
Mellon Bank's involvement in the management of the Turco site forced the
court to decide more precisely the degree of participation required for liability
to attach. Staff from the Bank sat on the facility's Advisory Board which
provided oversight for the operations of the facility,' giving the Bank the
opportunity to participate directly in the management of the facility. As with
the SBA, the Bank gave financial advice to the Board. According to the court,
109. Id.
110. Id. See also In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (secured creditor could
only be found liable if it participated in the management of the facility). See infra notes 294-98 and
accompanying text.
111. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995.
112. 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
113. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
114. Id. at 20,997.
115. Id. at 20,996-97.
116. Id. at 20,997.
117. Id.
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these activities alone were not enough to make the Bank an operator under
CERCLA. 8 The Bank, however, had more direct involvement with managing
the facility. For instance, Bank employees had established a reporting system
between the company and the Bank and had conducted site visits. These
activities were held to be sufficient to take Mellon Bank out of the secured
creditor exemption for the purposes of denying summary judgment. The court
stated:
The reed upon which the Mirabiles seek to impose liability on Mellon
is slender indeed; however, bearing in mind that all doubts are to be
resolved in favor of that party opposing a motion for summary
judgment, I conclude that, taken as a whole .... a genuine issue of fact
[exists] as to whether Mellon Bank . . . engaged in the sort of
participation in management which would bring a secured creditor
within the scope of CERCLA liability." 9
Thus, to the Mirabile court, the mere opportunity to participate in the
management of a facility was an insufficient basis for imposing liability on a
lending institution. Further, the mere financial participation at a facility, without
more, was not enough to cost lenders the protection of the secured creditor
exemption."a° The attendance at facility Board meetings, monitoring of cash,
and the visiting of the site, however, were found to have constituted sufficient
involvement to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
In contrast, United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. 2' held that a
lender's purchase of contaminated property on foreclosure could constitute the
sole basis for liability. In this case, a farm used for waste disposal operations
during the 1970s secured a mortgage from the Maryland Bank & Trust
Company.' The Bank foreclosed on the property and purchased it at the
118. Id.
119. Id. Specifically, the court noted that it would be helpful to have a clearer picture as to the
participation of Mellon Bank employees in the manufacturing process and the extent to which Mellon Bank
influenced management decisions. Id.
120. Since Mirabile, most lenders have changed their methods for making loans. Many lending
institutions have adopted an environmental risk policy and have hired environmental analysts to assist in
the risk assessment. Corash & Behrendt, supra note 100, at 865. Lenders, commonly requiring qualified
third parties to perform environmental audits on the borrower's facility prior to making a loan, are now also
requiring borrowers to (1) provide updated environmental audits during the term of the loan, and (2) set
aside a portion of the loan proceeds to cover the costs of removing minor environmental hazards identified
during the life of the loan. Id. "Such steps not only help lenders manage their risk under CERCLA, but also
exert a positive influence in the battle to clean up hazardous substances." Id.
121. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
122. Id. at 575.
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foreclosure sale. In 1983, after leaking and deteriorating drums of chemicals
were discovered at the facility, the EPA brought suit against the Bank to
recover its costs for cleaning the site. 2 3
The Bank argued that it should not be held liable under CERCLA, because
it was neither an "owner" nor an "operator," and because it was exempt from
CERCLA liability under the secured creditor exemption."a The Maryland
district court rejected both arguments, finding the Bank to be the "owner" by
virtue of its foreclosure and purchase of the facility. The court found the
security interest exemption to be inapplicable. 25 The court stated:
The [secured creditor] exemption ... covers only those persons who,
at the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-
held security interest in the land. The verb tense of the exclusionary
language is critical. The security interest must exist at the time of the
clean-up. The mortgage held by [the Bank] . . . terminated at the
foreclosure sale ... at which time it ripened into full title. [The Bank]
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale not to protect its security
interest, but to protect its investment. Only during the life of the
mortgage did [the Bank] hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect
its security interest in the land.'26
Unlike the Mirabile decision, no consideration was given to whether the
Bank had participated or even had the capacity to participate in decisions
relative to the hazardous substances. Rather, liability was imposed solely
because the lender became the record title owner as a result of the purchase of
the property upon foreclosure.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.27
dramatically expanded the basis upon which a secured creditor could be held
liable. The facts of Fleet are familiar: a financial institution, Fleet Bank, loaned
money to a facility, taking a security interest in the facility and its equipment,
inventory, and fixtures."as Contamination occurred because of activities at the
facility. The EPA sued the financial institution to recoup its cleanup costs. In
determining whether Fleet could be held liable under CERCLA, the court did
123. 'Id.
124. id. at 575-76.
125. See also Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 563 (W.D. Pa. 1989)
(when a lender is the successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the lender should be liable to the same
extent as any other bidder would have been).
126. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 579.
127. 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991). The case was before the court
on interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of the secured creditor's motion for summary
judgment. Because the district court's disposition involved legal questions of statutory interpretation, the
Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. Id. at 1553.
128. Id. at 1552.
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not follow the owner or operator analysis of earlier lender cases, but rather
construed the Act to impose liability directly on secured creditors as parties
who participate in the financial management of a facility.' 29
Under the standard we adopt today, a secured creditor may incur...
liability without being an operator, by participating in the financial
management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence
the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for
the secured creditor to actually involve itself in the day-to-day
operations of the facility in order to be liable-although such conduct
will certainly lead to the loss of the protection of the [secured creditor]
exemption.130
The Fleet Factors court thus departed from the Mirabile court's
determination that participation in the day-to-day operations of a facility was
required to impose liability. 3' The court imposed a broader standard whereby
financial management "indicating a capacity to influence" the treatment of
hazardous substances could lead to liability. Perhaps recognizing that this new
standard provided little real guidance as to the threshold at which involvement
would lead to the imposition of CERCLA liability, the court went on to
observe:
it [is not] necessary for the secured creditor to participate in
management decisions relating to hazardous waste. Rather, a secured
creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the
facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose.'32
This standard has proven particularly troubling to lenders because
commercial lending arrangements typically give substantial power to supervise
a borrower's financial management, and sometimes the facility's day-to-day
operations.
129. Id. at 1557. The court reasoned that persons involved in the operations of a facility are already
liable as operators under Section 9607(a)(2), and had Congress intended to absolve secured creditors from
ownership liability, it would have done so. Instead, Congress chose to explicitly hold secured creditors liable
if they participate in the management of a facility.
130. Id. at 1557-58 (emphasis added).
131. See supra notes 107-19 and accompanying text. Besides Mirabile, at least four other district courts
have followed the requirement that a secured creditor participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of
the facility before it will deny itself the protection of the secured creditor exemption. See United States v.
New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 866 (D. Del. 1989); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193,
1204-05 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. [U Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
Coastal Casing Serv. v. Aron, No. H-86-4463 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 1988). See also Part 1l supra (officer,
director, shareholder cases).
132. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1558 (footnote omitted).
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Although the Fleet decision is renowned for its holding, a review of the
facts makes the court's decision less remarkable. Fleet, after the facility went
bankrupt: (1) required the printing facility to get Fleet's approval prior to
shipping goods to customers; (2) established the price for excess inventory; (3)
determined when and to whom the finished goods should be shipped; (4)
determined when employees should be laid off; (5) supervised the site office
administrator; (6) received and processed employment and tax forms; (7)
controlled access to the facility; and (8) contracted with an industrial liquidator
to dispose of the fixtures and equipment.
33
Thus, despite the firestorm of criticism'3 over Fleet's broad standard for
imposing liability on secured creditors, a careful review of the facts reveals the
substantial degree of involvement in the debtor's business that would likely lead
to liability in other non-secured creditor, factual contexts.135 While the
language of Fleet seems to articulate a broad new standard of liability, its facts
support a less expansive basis of liability. Nevertheless, counsel advising clients
in the future will face the problem of predicting whether the broad
interpretation of Fleet will be emphasized.
The Ninth Circuit, in Bergsoe Metal Corp. v. East Asiatic Co., 36 although
explicitly "leaving for another day" consideration of the Fleet standard of
secured creditor liability, 37  provided a different perspective on lender
liability. Bergsoe involved a complex financial arrangement among a recycling
company, the Port of St. Helens, a municipal corporation, 38 and the United
States National Bank of Oregon. This arrangement involved a sale and
leaseback, and a mortgage on the property. 3
9
Shortly after the lead recycling facility began construction, Bergsoe, the
recycling company, defaulted on its leases. Eventually, the Bank forced Bergsoe
into involuntary bankruptcy."4 Subsequently, the Oregon Department of
133. Id. at 1559.
134. See, e.g., Michael B. Kupin, New Alterations of the Lender Liability Landscape: CERCLA After
the Fleet Factors Decisions, 19 REAL EST. L.J. 191 (1991); Sean P. Madden, Will the CERCLA be
Unbroken? Repairing the Damage After Fleet Factors, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 135 (1990); See Steven H.
Seel, Note, Fleet Factors and the Vanishing of CERCLA Section 10](20)(A), 10 J.L. & COM. 311 (1991);
Timothy R. Zinnecker, Lender Liability Under CERCLA and the Fleet-ing Protection of the Secure Creditor
Exemption, 44 S.W.L.J. 1449 (1991).
135. See supra Parts I (parent company liability), & 11 (officer, director, and shareholder liability).
136. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cit. 1990).
137. Id. at 612.
138. The municipal corporation was empowered to issue revenue bonds to promote the industrial
development in St. Helens, Oregon. Id. at 669.
139. Although the court's decision offers no explanation for the financial arrangement, probably, it
was a mechanism for providing Bergsoe with a federal income tax exemption. In this type of financing,
typically, a government agency is the issuer and nonrecourse obligor of the bonds, and a bank and/or the
public buys the bonds. The agency provides the asset or buys the asset and improves it with the bond
proceeds, and then leases it to a. business. The lease payments pay off the bonds. When paid in full, the
business/lessee acquires the real estate by exercising a purchase option.
140. Id., at 670.
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Environmental Quality discovered hazardous substance contamination at the
plant and brought an enforcement action against the lenders to procure facility
cleanup.
In assessing the municipal corporation's liability as an owner of the facility,
the court observed that, in at least one sense, the corporation owned the
recycling plant because the deed to the property was in its name.' 4 Based
upon the financial structure of the agreement, the court concluded that the
municipal corporation held the deed in the plant primarily to ensure that
Bergsoe would meet its obligations under the bonds. Therefore, the court
determined that the municipal corporation, in reality, held only a security
interest in the facility. 142
The court next determined that the Port of St. Helens could not be held
liable as an operator of the facility.
The [secured creditor provision of the] statute . . . provides little
guidance as to how much control over a facility a secured creditor can
exert before it will be liable for cleanup .... It is clear from the statute
that, whatever the precise parameters of "participation," there must be
some actual management of the facility before a secured creditor will
fall outside the exception. Here there was none, and we therefore need
not engage in line drawing.
43
The municipal corporation's participation in the financing and planning of
the facility's operation was found to be an insufficient ground to remove the
corporation from the secured creditor exemption. To the Bergsoe court, some
actual management of a facility was necessary in order for a secured lender to
become liable under CERCLA.
Bergsoe and Fleet appear to articulate potentially conflicting rules of
liability, although upon close examination of the specific facts in each case, the
decisions are easily harmonized. Lenders have been confused and duly
concerned by these conflicting rules and have been clamoring for legislative
specification of the kind and degree of involvement that will result in the
imposition of CERCLA liability upon them.'"
141. Id. at 671.
142. Id. As further evidence of this fact, the court noted that Bergsoe, not the Port of St. Helens, held
all the traditional indicia of ownership, such as responsibility for the payment of taxes, the purchase of
insurance, and the assumption of the risk of loss from destruction or damage to the property. These
traditional indicia of ownership, and not mere title to the property, thus were the critical factors for
establishing CERCLA liability. Id.
143. Id. at 672.
144. Final.EPA Rule Allows Traditional Lender Activities Without Superfund Liabilities, 23 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 3 at 326 (May 15, 1992) [hereinafter EPA Rule]. See also 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344.
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In response, the EPA, not the Congress, has issued a rule (Rule) that
"allows traditional lender activities without superfund liabilities." 4 The Rule
attempts to specify the range of actions lenders may undertake without incurring
liability, as well as to identify the kind and degree of involvement that will
result in CERCLA liability. For example, while the borrower is in possession
of the collateral, a lender is considered to be participating in the management
of the facility, and is unprotected by the secured creditor exemption, if the
lender: (1) exercises decision-making control over the borrower's environmental
compliance to the extent that the lender has undertaken the responsibility for
the borrower's hazardous substance handling or disposal practices; (2) exercises
control comparable to a manager, such that the lender has responsibility for the
borrower's day-to-day decision-making for environmental compliance; or (3)
exercises control comparable to a manager, so that the lender has responsibility
for the borrower's day-to-day decision-making for substantially all operational
aspects of the enterprise other than environmental compliance.1'4 Thus, a
lender who actually assumes responsibility for a borrower's hazardous
substances, environmental matters, or the general facility operations prior to
foreclosure, runs the risk of losing the protection of the secured creditor
exemption. Financial or administrative decision-making, however, imposes no
CERCLA liability. This Rule rejects the Fleet standard by providing that
participation in management is not shown merely by the existence of an
unexercised capacity to control or an ability to influence facility operations. 4 7
The Rule also provides guidance to lenders foreclosing on contaminated
property. Essentially, lenders who take title through foreclosure or its
equivalent, and maintain, protect, operate, or liquidate collateral are protected
under the secured creditor exemption, provided that the lender makes certain
specified or commercially reasonable efforts to sell or otherwise divest itself
of the property, and provided the lender does not outbid an offer at a
foreclosure sale or otherwise refuse a reasonable offer for the property. 48
Although the Rule provides guidance, it still leaves substantial room for
interpretation. Since the Rule is not a legislative enactment, courts remain free
to determine whether or not EPA's Rule properly interprets the meaning of the
secured creditor's exemption of CERCLA. Further, the Rule is not binding on
state courts in interpreting state laws similar to CERCLA. 49
145. EPA Rule, supra 144, at 326. See also 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344.
146. EPA Rule, supra 144, at 327.
147. Id. at 329.
148. Id. at 328. Reasonable commercial means of divesting a lender of contaminated property upon
which it has foreclosed is conclusively established under the Rule by listing, within twelve months of
foreclosure, the collateral with an appropriate broker, dealer, or agent, or by advertising it at least monthly
in a suitable trade publication or specified general circulation newspaper where the collateral is located. Id.
149. The Rule aside, lenders also still can be held liable under other provisions of CERCLA as
generators or transporters of hazardous substances.
As of this writing, the State of Michigan and the Chemical Manufacturers Association have filed
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Although neither the statute, the cases, nor EPA's Rule offer the precise
guidance needed to determine the extent to which a secured creditor must
participate in the management of a facility before CERCLA liability will
attach, 150 the facts of the lender liability cases, as well as EPA's Rule, support
the general principle that operator liability turns on participation in the day-to-
day management of the facility. While EPA's Rule would not hold liable a
lender who merely had the capacity to influence the operation of a facility,
Fleet still stands as good law, and courts, not bound by the EPA Rule, may still
find the rationale of Fleet persuasive. However, liability based on the Fleet
facts is less radical than commentators have suggested, particularly in light of
the CERCLA liability cases concerning corporate parents, officers, and
directors. If one is going to manage a business, even as a secured creditor, one
will have to deal with hazardous waste liability.
IV. Leases and Other Contractual Arrangements
Contractual relationships can also lead to liability in two significant
circumstances. First, a landlord, through a lease with a tenant, may incur
separate challenges to the Rule and EPA's authority to adopt it. Michigan v. EPA, No. 92-1312 (D.C. Cir.,
filed July 28, 1992); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 92-1314 (D.C. Cir., filed July 28, 1992). See
Superfund, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 1142 (Aug. 7, 1992).
In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Oaas, CV-90-75-BU-PGH, (D. Mont. Jan. 21, 1992), decided during the
pendency of the EPA's new lender liability rule, the court considered the proposed EPA rule. See Toxics
L. Rep. at 1166 (Feb. 26, 1992). ARCO, one of three parties held liable to the EPA for cleanup costs at
the Montana Pole & Treating Plant, sought recovery of some $2.8 million from the bank that took possession
of the facility upon liquidation of the property. ARCO argued that under current case law, the bank's
participation in the management of the liquidation was so pervasive that it could not hide behind CERCLA's
security interest shield. Further, the bank's management activities of the site far exceeded the minimum
needed to trigger liability under a Fleet test. Id. at 1167. The bank, however, secured a letter from the EPA,
applying EPA's proposed rule to the case, and concluding that the bank fell within the security interest
exemption. A decision in the case is pending. See also Waterville Indus. v. Finance Auth. of Maine, 984
F.2d 549 (1 st Cit. 1993) (while not explicitly applying the new EPA rules to its analysis of lender liability,
the court implicitly did so in declining to find a secured creditor, who held contaminated property as an
owner for a period of time, liable under CERCLA).
150. To avoid liability, the precautions taken by lenders should extend beyond the fear of foreclosure.
Because lenders also take stock and other forms of equity from borrowers as security on mortgages, it is
conceivable that a court could also find such lenders "owners" under CERCLA. Corash & Behrendt, supra
note 100, at 870.
See also Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Pa. 1989). For
additional discussion of the potential liability of lenders, see Patricia L. Quentel, Comment, The Liability
of Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 139
(1988), and Scott Wilsdon, Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in
Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HAsTINGs L.J. 1261 (1987).
Worthy of note is the fact that the courts, in determining operator liability for lenders, are applying
standards very similar, and in some cases identical to, the standard used to impose liability on a lender under
the Securities Exchange Act. In Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057
(1986), the court stated that to hold a lender liable under the Securities Exchange Act as a "controlling
person" of a corporation, the plaintiff must prove that the lender actually participated in, that is, exercised
control over, operations of the corporation in general. Additionally, the plaintiff must prove that the lender
possessed the power to control specific transactions or activity upon which the primary violation is
predicated, but need not prove that the latter power was exercised. Id. at 630-31.
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liability if its tenant's activities result in the release or threatened release of
hazardous substances. Second, services performed under a contract may result
in the imposition of CERCLA liability.
A. LandlordTenant Contracts
Potential liability arising from a contractual relationship has most frequently
arisen in the context of lease arrangements, and has focused on (1) whether
there is a direct contractual relationship, (2) whether the owner exercised due
care with respect to the tenant's activities, and (3) whether the owner took
precautions against events that were foreseeable, given the owner's knowledge
of the tenant's activities. 5'
In United States v. Argent Corp.,152 a landowner leased property to a
lessee whose activities resulted in the release of sodium cyanide at the facility.
In an attempt to escape CERCLA liability, the landowner argued that his only
relationship with the tenant was through the lease and that he had no knowledge
of or ability to control the tenant's activities. The New Mexico district court
rejected the landowner's arguments, finding that existence of contractual
relationship dispositive' 53 The extent that a landowner participates in a'
lessee's activities, or has the power to do so, was immaterial to the Argent court
in imposing CERCLA liability.'54
151. Certain owners of facilities, however, may escape CERCLA liability if they fall within the
"innocent landowner" defense. This defense, specifically provided for within the Act, allows an owner of
a facility, who is not also an operator, to escape CERCLA liability if it can be shown that the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance was caused solely by:
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one
whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or
indirectly with the defendant .... if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned .... and (b) he
took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the
consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988). To prove the element of due care, the defendant must demonstrate that "all
precautions ... that a similarly situated reasonable and prudent person would have taken in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances" were taken. H.R. REP. NO. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 34 (1980),
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6137.
In addition to this so-called "innocent landowner" defense, CERCLA also provides for two additional
defenses that limit liability in situations where the contamination results solely from (a) an act of God, or
(b) an act of war. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
152. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984).
153. Id.
154. See also United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1753 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984).
It should be noted that section 9607(e) of CERCLA specifically allows contractual parties to allocate
liability. Therefore, a lease could be written and entered into that (1) gives a landlord-owner control over
the activities of his or her tenant, and/or (2) provides for indemnification by the tenant for any release or
threatened release of hazardous substances. Because, by virtue of being an owner (and assuming the innocent
landowner defense cannot be successfully raised), a landlord-owner is liable for hazardous substance cleanup,
a provision giving the landlord-owner the ability to control the tenants' activities may allow a landlord-owner
to prevent conduct by the tenant that could result in the imposition of CERCLA liability and could
demonstrate that the landowner took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of the tenant. Properly
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In United States v. Monsanto,' the site owners leased a tract of land to
a chemical manufacturing corporation for the warehouse storage of raw
materials and finished products. More than 7,000 fifty-five gallon drums of
chemical waste were stored on the site in a haphazard and careless manner. 56
As a consequence, hazardous substances leaked and commingled, resulting in
noxious fumes, fires, and explosions. The EPA conducted a partial surface
cleanup, and thereafter brought suit against the site owners to recoup the
cleanup costs."5 7
The site owners argued that they were merely absentee landlords unaware
of and unconnected with the waste disposal activities and, therefore, could not
be held liable under CERCLA. Because (1) they entered a lease and they
accepted rent thereunder, and (2) no evidence was presented that the landlord
took precautions against the foreseeable conduct of the lessee, the court found
the imposition of CERCLA liability appropriate. According to the court:
[The site owners] argued to the trial court that, although they were
aware [the lessee] was a chemical manufacturing company, they were
completely ignorant of all waste disposal activities at [the site] before
1977. They maintained that they never inspected the site prior to that
time. In our view, the statute does not sanction such willful or negligent
blindness on the part of absentee owners.'
From Argent and Monsanto, a fundamental liability principle for landlords
emerges: by virtue of its contractual relationship with a tenant, a landlord incurs
liability unless due care is taken to prevent foreseeable CERCLA violations by
the lessee. Given the court's express extension of liability to "owners" of a site,
this principle is not surprising.
The degree of care that a landlord must show in order to escape CERCLA
liability was addressed by the courts in Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco,5 9
and Shapiro v. Alexanderson.'6° In Wickland, the defendant landlord knew
of the hazardous nature of the tenant's activities prior to the defendant's
written, the lease/contract could also give a landlord-owner, at a minimum, a breach of contract action
against the tenant for activity violative of CERCLA.
155. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
156. Id. at 164. The tenant had placed waste-laden drums "wherever there was space, often without
pallets to protect them from the damp ground. It stacked drums on top of one another without regard to
the chemical compatibility of their contents. It maintained no documented safety procedures and kept no
'inventory of the stored chemicals." Id.
157. Id. at 165.
158. Id. at 169. The site owners also contended that their lease with the lessee did not allow the lessee
to store chemical wastes on the site and this should thus relieve them of liability. Nevertheless, the court
held them liable under. CERCLA finding it sufficient that they owned the site at the time the hazardous
substances were deposited. Id.
159. 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,855 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1988).
160. 741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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acquisition of the property. In fact, Wickland had been advised to obtain legal
advice about the potential liability that could arise from heavy metal-laden slag
located on the property before purchasing the property. Based on these facts,
the court determined that Wickland could not escape liability. 6 ' Although
the release of hazardous substances resulted from activities of the tenant,
Wickland, having knowledge of these activities prior to his purchase of the
property, could hardly demonstrate that he exercised due care with respect to
the hazardous substances or took precautions against the foreseeable acts or
omissions of the tenant.
In Shapiro v. Alexanderson,162 the court also assessed whether due care
had been exercised to the extent necessary to relieve the landlord of CERCLA
liability. In this case, the court determined that the landlords had not exercised
due care when they knew of the leachate problem resulting from the lessees'
activities, but failed to respond to the problem until nearly five years later.163
Inattention to potential environmental problems, including an attempt to "see
nothing," thus affords no basis for claiming innocence when due care would
have prompted or necessitated action.
Unlike the problem presented in the previous two cases involving tenant
storage of hazardous materials, General Electric Co. v. Asarco
Transmissions'64 considered landlord responsibility for tenant conduct in
arranging for off-site disposal of wastes resulting from the tenant's business
operations. In that case, the landlords were large oil companies that leased
automobile service stations to tenant operators. The station at issue performed
automobile oil changes and contracted for the disposal of the waste oil that was
taken to what eventually became a hazardous waste site.
Although the leased premises included a storage tank for the temporary
storage of waste oil, the court refused to hold the oil companies liable as
landlords. While the oil companies did exercise substantial control over the
station operations, through lease provisions and related agreements, "none of
[the control] was directed toward either the generation of or the disposal of
waste oil."'1 65 This fact, combined with the absence of any obligation on the
landlord's part to exercise control over waste motor oil, led the court to refuse
161. Wickland Oil Terminals, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,856; 792 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir.
1989).
162. 741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
163. Id. at 478.
164. 962 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1992).
165. Id. at 287.
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to find liability. It rejected the plaintiffs' proposed standard, based on the
expansive language of Fleet, that the oil companies could be held liable if they
had the capacity to control the operator's behavior.
While "persons cannot escape liability by 'contracting away' their
responsibility or by alleging that [an] incident was caused by the act or
omission of a third party[,]" the mere existence of economic bargaining
power which would permit one party to impose certain terms and
conditions on another, does not itself create an obligation under
CERCLA. 16
6
General Electric, contains aspects of both landlord liability and contractual
liability, discussed below. As a landlord-tenant case, it can be distinguished by
the fact that the tenant's liability-creating conduct was waste generation and
arranging for disposal, rather than waste storage. Thus, the landlord was not
the "owner" of the waste site and could not be held to have "arranged for
disposal" of the wastes. All the other landlord tenant cases concerned "owner"
liability for disposal or storage on the leased land.
B. Contractual Services
Potential liability resulting from a contractual relationship can also arise
from work performed under that contract. Again, because of the magnitude of
cleanup costs, individuals or companies linked by a contract to the
contamination at another's facility may find themselves pursued as a liable
owner, operator, or a person who "arranged for" the disposal of hazardous
substances.
Edward Hines Lumber Co., v. Vulcan Materials Co. 1' involved an owner
and operator liability claim arising from the performance of contractual services.
Hines Lumber contracted with Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc. (Osmose) to
build a wood preserving plant. In addition to the design and construction,
Osmose trained Hines's employees to operate the plant's machinery, and
licensed Hines to use its trademark. Hines gave Osmose full and immediate
access to the plant and to all the chemical processes and products located or
produced for the purposes of insuring quality control according to Osmose's
standards.'68 Osmose promised to construct a closed-loop manufacturing
system so that a toxic preservative, chromated copper arsenate, would not
166. Id. at 286 (emphasis in original).
167. 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1457 (7th Cir. 1988).
168. Id. at 1458.
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escape. The system, however, did leak, and after Hines Lumber cleaned the site,
it sued Osmose to recover its costs. Hines claimed that Osmose was an
"operator" because of its involvement with the facility. 169
While the court noted that "getting rid of the chemicals [by Hines Lumber]
had been expensive," and that "[ilt [was] easy to see the attraction of sweeping
Osmose into the category of responsible persons"'7 ° because its alleged faulty
construction at the facility had resulted in the release of hazardous
substances, 7' the court concluded that Osmose could not be liable as an
"operator" of the facility.
The statute does not fix liability on slipshod architects, clumsy
engineers, poor construction contractors, or negligent suppliers of on-
the-job training--and the fact that Osmose may have been all four rolled
into one does not change matters. The liability falls on owners and
operators; architects, engineers, construction contractors, and instructors
must chip in only to the extent they have agreed to do so by
contract.7
The court recognized that not holding individuals or companies, such as
Osmose, liable as operators provided such companies with little incentive to
take greater care in the design and construction of facilities utilizing hazardous
substances.'73 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the parties' contract itself,
not CERCLA, was the mechanism for addressing such matters.
The desire of [facility] operators to minimize their own liability will
lead them to pay close attention to their designers and supplier. When
they lack the expertise to supervise closely, they can induce their
contracting partners to take care by insisting on warranties and
indemnification.... The Superfund Act places liability on the "owner
or operator" of the facility. Large potential obligations concentrate the
mind wonderfully, leading the owner-operator to assign duties and
liabilities by contract to those who can best take precautions. 71
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. As the case arose under a motion for summary judgment, the court had to accept the facts asserted
as true.
172. Id. at 1458-59.
173. Id. at 1458.
174. Id. at 1460. See, e.g., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1990);
Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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Therefore, Hines could have bargained for indemnification in its contract
with Osmose, and having failed to do so, Hines had "only itself to blame."' 75
The court looked to the various common law categories of vicarious liability
and did not find any to fit the facts of this case. The court did not evaluate the
extent to which predicating liability on Osmose's involvement would further
fundamental CERCLA policy.
In contrast, United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp.'7 6 found
CERCLA liability based on the performance of contractual services. The United
States and the State of Iowa sought to recover from eight defendants, the
response costs incurred in cleaning a manufacturing site by the Aidex Company.
Aidex had contracted with the defendants, manufacturers of active pesticide
ingredients, to produce a commercial grade product. Aidex had mixed the
manufacturer's active ingredients with inert materials using the specifications
provided by the manufacturer. The resulting commercial grade product was then
packaged by Aidex and either shipped back to the manufacturer or shipped
directly to the customers of the manufacturer. The defendants owned the
technical grade pesticide while it was in Aidex's possession.'77
Instead of trying to force fit the defendants into CERCLA's owner or
operator categories, as did the unsuccessful plaintiff in Hines Lumber,'78 the
plaintiffs here sought to hold the defendants liable as "generators," defined by
CERCLA as the arrangers of hazardous substance disposal.'79 Under section
9607(a)(3), a person or business, that is not an owner or operator of a facility,
can still be held liable for cleanup costs if they arranged for the disposal of
hazardous substances. In pertinent part, section 9607(a)(3) provides that:
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person .... from which there is a release, or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, . . . shall be liable
for-(A) all costs of removal or remedial action.'
The defendants argued that Aidex, not they, owned the hazardous waste and
made the crucial decision how it would be disposed of, or treated, and by
175. Edward Hines Lumber Co., v. Vulcan Materials Co., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1457, 1460 (7th
Cir. 1988).
176. 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1529 (8th Cir. 1989).
177. Id. at 1530.
178. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
179. 29 Env't Rep. at 1530. The plaintiffs also sought to recover against the defendants under section
7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, arguing that, by virtue of the defendants' relationship
with Aidex, they "contributed to" the handling, storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous wastes.
180. 2 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
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whom. 8 ' Further, they had contracted with Aidex to formulate, not to dispose
of, hazardous substances, and therefore, the imposition of liability under
CERCLA, on these facts, would lead to limitless liability. Additionally, the
defendants asserted that the plain meaning of section 9607(a)(3) requires an
intent to dispose of some waste, or, at the very least, the authority to control
the disposal process. Because they had neither the intent to conduct waste
disposal nor the ability to control any waste disposal, they could not be held
liable under CERCLA.
182
The Eighth Circuit rejected the defendants' reading of the statute, and
guided by the broad language in section 9607(a)(3) and the liberal interpretation
previous courts had afforded CERCLA, denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss. It reasoned: "Aidex is performing a process on products owned by the
defendants for the defendants' benefit and at their direction; waste is generated
and disposed of contemporaneously with the process."'' 83 Because waste
generation, and presumably its disposal was an inherent part of manufacturing
the defendants' products, the court refused to allow the defendants, by contract,
to avoid the responsibility for the disposal of those wastes.
Thus, the court concluded that the defendants could be held liable under
CERCLA as arrangers of hazardous substance disposal. "Any other decision
under the circumstances of this case, would allow [the] defendants to simply
close their eyes to the method of disposal of their hazardous substances, a result
contrary to the policies underlying CERCLA."'
While different statutorily defined categories of liability are involved, the
cases in this Section appear to articulate different basic CERCLA policies. In
Hines Lumber, the court did not impose liability on one whose contractual work
arguably resulted in the release of hazardous substances; in Aceto, relying on
"arranged for" liability, the court imposed liability based on a contractual
relation. Aceto indirectly supports the principle that a manufacturer must take
care to insure proper disposal of the hazardous substances that are part of its
manufacturing operations.'85 However, the court had to extend the statutory
language and liberally interpret the contract to include disposal as part of the
process of pesticide manufacturing.
181. Id. at 1533.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1535.
184. Id. at 1536 (internal quotation omitted).
185. See also Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 34 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1203, 1212 (C.D.
Cal. 1991) (noting that case law has established three approaches for determining whether particular acts
constitute "arranger" liability: (1) courts look beyond a defendant's characterization to determine whether
a transaction, in fact, involved an arrangement for hazardous waste disposal; (2) courts determine if persons
have a legal responsibility for hazardous substance disposal, finding that such individuals cannot evade their
responsibility by closing their eyes to the method of disposal; and (3) courts have stated that a liberal
interpretation of CERCLA's terms is necessary to achieve CERCLA's overwhelmingly remedial goal).
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Hines Lumber was concerned with owner or operator liability, rather than
arranged-for-disposal liability, but this does not satisfactorily distinguish the
cases. "'86 Without questioning the result reached by the court, the court's
approach towards the case is troubling because it did not look to Osmose's
actual involvement with the business or its waste management. If the court had
done so, it would likely have concluded that Osmose was not so directly
involved with the operation of Hines's business in general, or its waste disposal,
specifically, to warrant liability. In this respect, the decision in Hines Lumber,
if not the rationale, is compatible with the results of the parent-subsidiary and
corporate principal cases discussed above.'87
This conclusion is broadly supported by the Second Circuit's recent opinion
in General Electric Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 88 discussed above.
That opinion refused to find oil companies liable for the offsite waste disposal
of used motor oil by their franchise service station operators. The station
operators were liable because, in CERCLA terms, they arranged for the disposal
of oil. The plaintiffs sought to extend this liability to the oil company
franchisors because they had the unexercised capacity to control their
franchisees' waste disposal practices. However, the court found such
unexercised capacity, without more, to be an insufficient basis for liability.
Specifically, the court required some obligation to control waste disposal
as the key to arranger liability." 9 Here, the oil companies did not require
station operators to perform oil changes which generated the wastes, and did
not get involved in any aspect of the station operators' waste disposal. The
court concluded that an insufficient "nexus [existed] between the potentially
responsible party and the disposal of a hazardous substance."' 9 ° Aceto was
distinguishable because the defendant there owned the raw material and
contracted for the production of the final product, thus providing the "nexus"
to the disposal of the waste that was inevitably generated.
Within a contractual relationship, therefore, liability will attach to landlords
who fail to exercise due care with respect to their tenant's activities. Other
contracting parties will be liable if their involvement with the handling of
disposal of hazardous substances is reasonably direct.
V. Government Liability
This Part examines cases where the government allegedly became an
operator of a facility, either in the course of regulating to supervise cleanups,
186. See supra, Part 1, courts refusing such a distinction in the parent-subsidiary cases.
187. See Parts I & 1, supra.
188. 962 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1992). The franchisors were also landlords. See supra notes 163-65 and
accompanying text.
189. Id. at 286.
190. Id.
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or through contractual or other controls over facility operations.' 9' These
cases provide general support for the proposition that those managing the
business must bear liability for its waste disposal. But they also reflect a desire
to limit the liability flowing from regulatory actions.
CERCLA has two specific provisions on governmental liability. Its
definition of owner or operator provides that "[t]he term... does not include
a unit of State or local government which acquired ownership or control
involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other
circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue
of its function as sovereign."' 19 2 The definition notes that this exclusion -"shall
not apply to any State or local government which has caused or contributed to
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance."' 93
Section 9620(a)(1) further provides that:
[e]ach department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States
(including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the
same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under
section 9607 of this title.' 94
In FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce,"' a
Pennsylvania district court held that the government, by virtue of its
comprehensive regulations, supervision, and control of the rayon industry, was
liable under CERCLA as an operator.'96 During World War II, the United
States government classified high tenacity rayon as a high priority defense item
and, through the War Production Board, worked to facilitate its production. As
a result, American Viscose, the predecessor to FMC increased its production
of high tenacity rayon tire cord from approximately fifteen million pounds to
over eighty-two million pounds per year.' In 1982, carbon disulfide was
191. Our concern is with these indirect governmental liability cases; we will not consider CERCLA
liability of governmental entities based on their own disposal of wastes.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 300). EPA's lender liability rule also provides government agencies with the same protection as those
for lenders. Further, the Rule provides that where a governmental lending institution involuntarily acquires
assets to which the exemption would not apply, such assets may be considered "involuntarily" acquired
for purposes of the innocent landowner defense. See supra note 149.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1988).
195. 786 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1992). See also FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 20
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,403 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1990) (proceeding on a motion to dismiss).
196. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), CERCLA liability may attach if a party's past actions contributed
to the environmental damage even if that party is not currently in possession of the property or toxic
substances. On this basis, FMC sought to hold the United States liable under CERCLA. FMC Corp. v.
United States Dep't of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. at 472.
197. Id. at 476-77.
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discovered in the ground water in the vicinity of the American Viscose facility,
and in 1986 the EPA listed the facility on the National Priorities List of
locations to be given top priority for remedial action. FMC, which had owned
the facility since 1963, complied with the EPA's cleanup orders and then sued
the federal government.'
FMC pointed to evidence that the government determined and decided (1)
the quantity of rayon to be produced, (2) the sales price of the rayon, (3) the
plant size, and (4) the design and installation of government equipment at the
site.' 99 Further, during the time that the government personnel were at the
site, highly visible waste disposal was on-going. 2° The court agreed with
FMC's argument that the United States government was an operator of the
facility because its total domination of the rayon production market gave it
effective control over the daily management decisions at the facility.2 '
In United States v. Dart Industries, Inc.,2 three generators of hazardous
waste who disposed of their waste at the Fort Lawn waste disposal site brought
suit against the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control (DHEC), alleging that the DHEC was an owner or operator of the
facility. 0 3 The DREC authorized the storage of certain chemicals at the waste
site and required generators to comply with a waste tracking manifest system
for the transportation of hazardous wastes to the site. The DHEC also promised
to install monitoring wells on the site, but failed to do so.2 4
The court ruled that the DHEC's regulatory activities would not support
CERCLA liability. The DHEC was found to have only "loosely" regulated
activities at the Fort Lawn site. The court concluded that DHEC's involvement
did not go beyond the governmental supervision necessary to bring the site into
compliance with the State's environmental regulations.0 5 That DHEC had
approved or disapproved applications to store wastes at the Fort Lawn site, and
required proper transportation of the wastes delivered to the site, was adjudged
to be insufficient grounds upon which to hold DHEC liable as an operator.
Although the court did not dispute that DHEC may have inadequately
enforced the state environmental regulations with respect to the installation of
monitoring wells, such a deficiency did not constitute "ownership or control"
upon which liability could be based.0 6 Because the generators were unable
to specify any "hands on activities by DHEC that contributed to the release of
198. Id. at 473.
199. Id. at 475-78, 480, 483.
200. Id. at 478, 484-85.
201. Id. at 472, 474-75.
202. 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988).
203. Id. at 145.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 146.
206. Id.
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hazardous wastes,"2 7 the DHEC's activities could only be described as "a
series of regulatory actions," and not activities upon which operator liability
could attach.2 8
These cases share a common foundation. If the government goes beyond
regulating to insure compliance with the law and makes management decisions
about a facility, or has the power to control the site, it may be liable as an
operator under CERCLA. The government liability cases are broadly supportive
of the thesis that liability is based on actual management of the business and
its waste operations.2 9 However, the cases also limit liability of governments
when they act solely as regulators.
VI. Successor Corporation Lialility
This Part and the next are concerned with cases which present rather
different fact patterns from the discussion thus far. To this point, this Article
has been concerned with applying CERCLA to reach parties that have had some
involvement with the business or its waste. In contrast, this Part and the next
are concerned with entities, corporations or individual shareholders, that are
potentially liable under CERCLA because of their relationship to the relevant
owner, operator, or generator, rather than as a result of their specific conduct.
This Part considers the extent to which corporate successors are liable for the
transgressions of their predecessors. The next Part will examine the extent to
which corporations, otherwise formally dissolved, will be held accountable for
past CERCLA liabilities.210
Successorship liability under CERCLA typically turns on the application
of common law exceptions to the general principle of nonliability in asset
acquisitions. The common law starts with the idea that liability of a corporation
acquiring the assets of another is controlled by the contract of sale which,
typically, does not make the buyer responsible for the seller's liabilities."'
However, the common law has developed several well recognized exceptions
to this general principal of nonliability, four of which have been applied
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See also Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, No. CV 89-7368-WMB (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24,
1991); United States v. George Trucking Co., No. 85-2463-WD (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 1991) (both denying
the governments' motions for dismissal finding that the government could be liable under CERCLA).
210. This frequently becomes a claim against the present holders of former corporate assets.
BLUMBERG, supra note 13, at § 13.05 (1987), and authorities cited therein, gives an excellent summary of
the common law and its exceptions. See 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 7122-23 (Rev. Perm. ed. 1983).
211. In contrast, a stock acquisition or merger would leave the liabilities with the acquired corporation,
ultimately diminishing its value and presumably its price, to the extent liabilities were known.
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regularly in CERCLA cases.212 First, successor liability can be found where
the successor is a "mere continuation" of the predecessor. Second, corporation
law doctrine that the transaction was a real or "de facto" merger of the two
companies has provided a basis for successor liability. Third, liability has been
found where the successor contractually agreed, expressly or implicitly, to be
responsible for the liabilities of its predecessor. Fourth, successor liability has
been imposed on asset transfers that are merely fraudulent attempts to evade
liability. These common law theories, both in their traditional form and as
specifically developed, have provided the rationale for successor liability in
CERCLA cases.213
The broad principle of successor liability in CERCLA cases was established
in Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex, Corp.t Here, Phillip Carey
Corp. deposited wastes on property subsequently sold to the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff sought contribution for the cleanup costs from Carey's corporate
successor, Celotex.1 5 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the
general corporate law rule that the resulting corporation in a merger or
consolidation assumes all of the liabilities of the combining corporations.
Although it concerned the easier situation of a corporate merger, rather than
212. BLUMBERG, supra note 13, at § 13.05.1 discusses five exceptions. In addition to the ones discussed
here, successor liability can be based on commercial, corporation or bankruptcy law where the transfer was
without sufficient consideration and left insufficient assets to cover outstanding liabilities. Id.
213. The following discussion draws heavily from BLUMBERG, supra note 11, § 18.02 and BLUMBERG,
STRASSER & EVANS, 1992 SUPPLEMENT, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: STATUTORY LAW-GENERAL
(1992).
Successor liability has attracted an enormous volume of law review commentary. In addition to articles
cited in note 11, supra, see, Merritt B. Fox, Corporate Successors Under Strict Liability: A General
Economic Theory and the Case of CERCLA, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 (1991); Teresa Stewart, Note,
Cover Your Assets! Expanding Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 56 MO. L. REV. 427 (1991 ); Chatfield-
Taylor, Successors Beware: Expanding the Liability Net Under CERCLA Section 9607(a) Through
Application of Exceptions to the Traditional Common Law Doctrine of Successor Nonliability in Asset
Acquisitions, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 442 (1990); David C. Clarke, Note, Successor Liability Under CERCLA:
A Federal Common Law Approach, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1300 (1990); W. Scott Laseter & Cheryl A.
Long, CERCLA Liability for Successor Corporations Revisited, 41 MERCER L. REV. 1027 (1990); L. De-
Wayne Layfield, Note, CERCLA, Successor Liability, and the Federal Common Law: Responding to An
Uncertain Legal Standard, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1237 (1990); Alfred R. Light, "Product Line" and "Continuity
of Enterprise" Theories of Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 11 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 63
(1990); Daniel H. Squire et al., Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA: Who's Next?, 43 Sw. L.J.
887 (1990); Guerra, The Doctrine of Corporate Successor Liability is Appropriate in Contribution Claims
Under CERCLA but Caveat Emptor is Not Available as a Defense to the Seller of Property in an Action
Seeking Contribution for Clean-up Costs, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 823 (1989); Mark J. Rater, Comment, The
Implications of CERCLA in Corporate Reorganizations, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 765 (1989); Mark J.
Thurber, Note, Successor Liability of Financial Institutions Under CERCLA-A Takings and Policy Analysis,
1988 CoLum. Bus. L. REV. 243 (1988); Kathryn A. Barnard, EPA's Policy of Corporate Successor Liability
Under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 78 (1986-87); Diane M. Connolly, Comment, Successor Landowner
Suits for Recovery of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: CERCLA Section 107(a)(4), 33 UCLA L. REV. 1737
(1986); John C. Solomon, Comment, Successor Corporate Liability for Improper Disposal of Hazardous
Waste, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 909 (1985).
214. 851 F.2d. 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989).
215. Through a series of statutory mergers and consolidations that began in 1967, Celotex emerged
as the ultimate successor. There was no claim that these transactions had been undertaken to evade cleanup
liability.
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an asset acquisition, the case is important because the court expanded
CERCLA's basic policy of polluter liability, to include a policy favoring
successor liability:
Congressional intent supports the conclusion that, when choosing
between the taxpayers [via superfund payment for cleanup] or a
successor corporation, the successor.should bear the cost. Benefits from
use of the pollutant as well as savings resulting from the failure to use
non-hazardous disposal methods inured to the original corporation, its
successors, and their respective stockholders and accrued only indirectly,
if at all, to the general public. We believe it is in line with the thrust
of the legislation to permit-if not require-successor liability under
traditional concepts. 16
The court concluded that Congress intended the federal courts to develop
a body of federal common law to determine CERCLA liability, and instructed
the federal courts that: "[T]he general doctrine of successor liability in operation
in most states should guide the court's decision rather than the excessively
narrow statutes which might apply in only a few states. 21 7
A. "Mere Continuation" Liability
Several cases have found the successor to be a "mere continuation" of the
original corporation, and thus liable under CERCLA. United States v.
Distler2" concerned a new business that had different shareholders but was
otherwise a continuation of the same commercial operation. Three of the
company's top employees purchased the business through a new corporation
and the court relied heavily on the principles articulated in Smith Land to
decide that successor liability was appropriate. The traditional mere continuation
rule requires an identity of shareholders between the buyer and the seller, a
requirement that was not satisfied here. However, the court expanded the
concept of mere continuation, relying on recent developments in successor
liability that emphasized the ideas of "substantial continuity" or "continuation
of enterprise." The court adopted this standard and found it satisfied in this
case. As a commercial matter, this corporation clearly was a continuation of
216. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92. See also United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478
(4th Cir. 1992) at 486-87 for a similar discussion, although in a case where the court ultimately held that
the facts did not support finding successor liability.
217. 851 F. 2d at 92. Where none of the four traditional exceptions to successor nonliability are
applicable, successor liability has been denied. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp.
1491 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (claimed successor was a trust which had not been fraudulently set up to evade
CERCLA liability).
218. United States v. Distler, 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1097 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
Vol. 10: 493, 1993
CERCLA Liability
the same business, complete with the same employees, supervisors, production
facilities, products, name, assets, and general business operations. The company
was also held out to the public as the same business.
United States v. Carolina Transformer Co.2 9 applied a broad conception
of "substantial continuity" to ensnare a blatant attempt to avoid CERCLA
liability. Carolina Transformer transferred a large portion of its assets, business,
equipment inventory, and employees to FayTranCo. The two companies also
shared several directors. The court held that FayTranCo was liable as a
corporate successor to Carolina Transformer, despite changes in the identity of
shareholders. The sole shareholder of Carolina Transformer owned no stock in
the successor, but his children did, and the court found that he had control, in
fact, over the company. Thus, the nominal change of shareholders, with no real
change in the control over the business, did not defeat application of the mere
continuation rule.
In Sylvester Brothers Development. Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R.,22
the court applied the broader mere continuation principle, though there was no
continuity of shareholders, because the transaction had been arranged as an
asset purchase. The buying corporation had several of the same corporate
officers, and at least one continuing director. It also occupied the same physical
location, conducted its business with the same assets, and had the same address
and phone number. The court found substantial continuity based on these
specific facts. The court also noted that it would have applied a broader
continuity concept than the traditional common law one if required to effectuate
CERCLA's remedial purposes. As discussed below, the court gave the de facto
merger doctrine of successor liability a much more restrictive reading.
However, two cases show that the courts do not uniformly attach liability
under either branch of the "continuation" tree. The first case used the traditional
mere continuity standard in its analysis. In an asset purchase, the court, in Con-
Tech Sales Defined Benefit Trust v. Cockerham,22" ' held that the fact that the
shareholders of the two companies were different, combined with the fact that
the seller did not dissolve shortly after the transaction, made this doctrine
inapplicable. As a question of CERCLA policy, this result is questionable, for
219. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989), affd, 978 F.2d
832 (4th Cir. 1992). The Court of Appeals concluded:
We are unwilling to hold that merely by splitting-off the particular part of its operations that
resulted in its environmental problems and shifting the remainder of its assets, employees,
management, customers, accounts and productions methods to another corporation, an otherwise
responsible company could all but completely wash its hands of its environmental liability. Such
a result, we think, would not serve the remedial purposes of CERCLA... Id. at 840.
The "substantial continuity" doctrine grows out of labor law and modem products liability cases. Kezsbom
et al., supra note 11, at 50-51.
220. Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R., 1990 (772 F. Supp. 443) (D. Minn. 1990).
221. Con-Tech Sales Defined Benefit Trust v. Cockerham, 1991 Trade Cas. (CCH) 169, 294, (E.D.
Pa. 1991).
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it leaves open the possibility of evading liability, and thus, CERCLA's polluter
pays policy, in a carefully structured transaction. However, the doctrinal damage
was contained in this case. The court found potential successor liability on the
theory that the buyer had contractually assumed the seller's liabilities as part
of the transaction, and denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
United States v. Chrysler Corp.222 also found no continuation liability.
This case involved a business that had previously operated a bus service and
a waste disposal service. In essence the business was split in two, and each
operation was then conducted by a separate corporation. The waste disposal
business wound up with CERCLA liabilities, and the government
unsuccessfully sought to hold the corporation operating the bus company liable
as a mere continuation of the whole business. Although there was little question
that the bus company corporation was a continuation of the bus business
operations of the predecessor corporation, the court held that it was not liable
on a continuation theory because there was no "substantial commonality" of
either shareholders or directors.
The result is defensible, but could perhaps be better justified with reference
to the real business activities of the bus company. The bus company business
operations were not responsible for generating the waste at issue, so those
operations should not necessarily be used to fund the cleanup. However, in both
this case and Con-Tech, the protection afforded to the successor from the
continuation doctrine proved ultimately ineffective. In each, the successor was
eventually held potentially liable because it contractually assumed the
obligations of the predecessor in the transfer transaction. This relatively easy
route to liability in each case undercuts, to some degree, each court's refusal
to find liability on continuation grounds.
The decision-making in specific cases can be genuinely difficult, as shown
in United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co.223 The successor purchased
its former competitor's business in order to acquire its waste oil collection
routes, trucks, and operating personnel. The district court found liability despite
the fact that -the corporate successor had different shareholders, officers, and
directors. The successor continued the oil collection business in virtually
identical fashion. Specifically, it used the same management and employees,
serviced the same customers over the same routes, and kept the same telephone
number, address, trucks, and receipts. The successor held itself out to the public
as the same business; indeed, many customers were unaware that they were
222. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1997 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 1990).
223. 764 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992).
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doing business with a different corporation. In addition, the purchase agreement
required the successor to use its best efforts to elect the son of the predecessor's
president and major shareholder to the successor's board, and the son was
ultimately hired to manage the facility.
The district court found liability "as a successor corporation of PWOS [the
predecessor] under a broadened version of the 'mere continuation' exception
known as the 'substantial continuity' or 'continuity of enterprise'
exception." 2 (It refused to find liability on a de facto merger theory.)
However, the Eighth Circuit reversed, emphasizing two facts. First, the
successor was a separate business organization with larger operations, and these
operations preceded the acquisition. In addition, the successor was completely
unaware of the oil storage tanks that led to the liability at issue. They were not
used as part of the operation acquired, had never been listed as assets belonging
to the seller, and had apparently never been discussed in connection with the
transaction. While the court's language strongly supported the principle of
successor liability, it determined that the facts presented did not warrant
liability.
B. "De Facto Merger" Liability
In a broadly reasoned opinion that relied on Smith Land, In re Acushnet
River & New Bedford Harbor225 found one defendant's purchase of corporate
assets to be a de facto merger. A de facto merger requires, first, a real
continuity of the enterprise. In Acushnet, the new business had the same
president, vice-president, treasurer, three directors, employees, and product
lines. De facto mergers have also traditionally required that the same
stockholders own the business after the transaction as before. This opinion
slightly modified the traditional requirement of shareholder identity, finding
continuity even though the buyer, a wholly-owned subsidiary, was technically
a different corporation. The buyer paid for the transaction with stock of its
corporate parent rather than with its own shares. The court noted that any other
rule would permit easy evasion of responsibility under CERCLA by setting up
a wholly-owned subsidiary to buy another firm's assets, even though real
224. Id. at 20. In Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvent Reclaiming, Inc., No. 86C 20377, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19183 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 1991), the contract for sale of the operating business assets also provided
for the buyer to lease the seller's business premises, to employ the seller's president and another of its
principals, and to pay the seller's severance pay and other collective bargaining obligations. The court held
that these facts stated a cause of action under either the traditional "mere continuation" theory or the more
modem "continuing enterprise," and thus denied the buyer's motion for summary judgment. Chesapeake
and Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., No. 92-506, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18,905
(E.D. Va. Dec. 3, 1992) applied the continuation doctrine to a business continued as a sole proprietorship.
225. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp.
1010 (D. Mass. 1989). See also Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446 (W.D. Mich. 1988);
Ametek, Inc. v. Pioneer Salt & Chem. Co., 709 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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control over the purchased business would remain with the parent. Reality of
control, rather than technical ownership, controlled here. Finally, as required
by the traditional de facto merger analysis, the predecessor ceased business and
liquidated the business after the large sale. The sale was conditioned on
treatment as a tax free reorganization. Indeed, the transaction was set up to be
a true merger except for the disclaimer of environmental cleanup liability.
In summary, this Court will not enforce Aerovox's [the successor
parent] attempt to separate the burdens from the benefits of acquiring
Belleville. The transaction was structured to provide the maximum
continuity possible. . . It would be manifest injustice under these
circumstances to permit Aerovox to contract away Belleville's liability
for PCB contamination. 226
In contrast to generally broad findings of liability, several de facto merger
cases have applied the doctrine more strictly and have refused to find CERCLA
liability. The leading case, Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc.,227 cited
Smith Land favorably and spoke in general terms of the need for broad
successor liability to implement the underlying policy of CERCLA. However,
it held that the requirements of successor liability were not satisfied. There was
no de facto merger because, in this asset purchase, there was no continuity of
shareholders.22 8
Two opinions in American National Can Co. v. Kerr Glass Manufacturing
Corp.,"' in combination, reach a similar result. The first, granting summary
judgment to the plaintiff, emphasized the need for broad successor liability,
cited Smith Land approvingly, and found a de facto merger, even though the
successor had substantially expanded and improved the predecessor's business
and terminated one part of its operation. Many of the employees, customers,
and operations remained the same. However, the second opinion reversed this
grant of summary judgment after considering the defendant's reply brief.
Emphasizing "numerous manufacturing and marketing changes," as well as the
new fact that the successor stopped using the predecessor's distinctive marks
on the manufactured product, the court held that a triable issue of fact was
presented.
226. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp.
1010, 1019 (D. Mass. 1989).
227. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
228. Interestingly, the court also found no successor liability on a continuity theory, not because of
the change in shareholders, but because the buyer did not continue the business that handled the hazardous
waste and it bad no knowledge of the potential CERCLA liability.
229. American Nat'l Can Co. v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp., No. 89 C 0168,1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10,999
(N.D. 111. Aug. 26, 1990); No. 89 C 0168, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,417 (N.D. 111. Aug. 29, 1990).
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As discussed above, two cases that applied a strict de facto merger doctrine
to deny liability on that ground, did find liability based on other exceptions,
although one was reversed on appeal. 30
C. Fraudulent Conveyance
The third exception to successor corporation nonliability, the fraudulent
conveyance theory, has been applied in one case to hold a successor liable.1
3 1
One of the motivations for the corporate restructuring in this case was the
desire to avoid making all the assets of the corporation subject to CERCLA
cleanup liability. The court held that this motivation was sufficient to establish
a fraudulent intent once the corporation knew that some liability was likely,
even if the exact amount of liability was not then known.232 The effect of this
decision, if it is sustained on appeal, will be to greatly restrict the strategy of
restructuring to limit environmental cleanup liability.
The brief discussion of successor liability in United States v. Petersen Sand
& Gravel, Inc.2 33 used the absence of fraudulent purpose to reach a surprising
result. Here a sole proprietorship had been incorporated in 1970, with no
purpose to evade CERCLA liability. The court relied on the absence of
fraudulent intent, as well as the absence of contractual assumption of liabilities,
to justify a finding of no successor liability. However, the court's brief
treatment of the issue did not consider or evaluate continuation theory of
liability that would, apparently, have fit the facts.'
D. Choice of Law
Choice of law issues arise in successorship cases because the relevant rules
are typically based on state corporation law doctrines. Anspec v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.235 offered a clear discussion of the source of law questions to
230. United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 764 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 980 F.2d
478 (8th Cir. 1992); Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R., 772 F. Supp. 443 (D. Minn.
1990). Both used modem "substantial continuity" analyses.
231. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
232. Id.
233. 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1349-51 (N.D. 111. 1992).
234. The fourth exception is contractual assumption of the seller's liability by the buyer. As discussed
above, this has been found potentially applicable in two cases that refused to find mere continuation liability.
Con-Tech Sales Defined Benefit Trust v. Cockerham, No. 87-513, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 664 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 16, 1991); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1997, 1991-1 Trade Cos. (CCH)
1 69,294. (D. Del. Aug. 28, 1990).
235. 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991). See GRM Indus. v. Wickes Mfg. Co., 749 F. Supp. 810 (W.D.
Mich. 1990).
The district court's opinion in Anspec had been the leading exposition of the view that successor
liability was generally inappropriate under CERCLA because Congress had not expressly provided for it.
The lower court had written quite broadly of CERCLA policy, expressly disagree ing with Smith Land and
purported to adopt a general rule precluding successor liability. Anspec Co., v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 734
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be used to determine successor liability. After reaffirming its basic policy
favoring broad successor liability in CERCLA cases, the Sixth Circuit held that
when Congress used the term "corporation" in CERCLA, it intended to adopt
prevailing ideas of successor liability in state corporation law. This holding was
supported by the general federal statutory interpretation policy to include
successors whenever corporations are referred to. Thus, according to the court,
state corporation law on successor liability will control. This conclusion mirrors
the policy expressed in both Smith Land and Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco,
Inc.,236 although the court in. the latter case also noted the need for a uniform
rule.
Unfortunately, the cases have not been consistent in this preference for state
law. While most have avoided explicitly adopting a federal common law of
CERCLA successor liability, many emphasize the need for broad liability to
meet the statute's remedial goals and indicate their willingness to use and
broaden state law liability concepts if needed.23 This appears to present a
conflict over the source and content of successor liability law, although the
conflict may be of little consequence. As shown above, the state law doctrines
of successor liability are themselves evolving, and are somewhat elastic, so they
may be able to accommodate federal policy goals.
E. Conclusion
Precise conclusions from the cases about the extent of successor corporate
liability are difficult to develop. Most of the continuation theory cases speak
broadly of CERCLA's remedial purposes and hold in favor of successor
liability, although a recognizable minority refuse to find such liability. The de
facto merger cases, while expressing concern for CERCLA's remedial purposes,
also express concern for the limits of Successor liability. More often than not,
the courts, in considering de facto merger cases, do not hold successors liable.
Most cases ultimately impose successor liability on one of these theories.
Where liability is denied on either theory, however, the absence of
continuity of shareholders is emphasized as a prominent fact. This is not a good
predictive variable because many of the continuity theory cases have been
untroubled by the lack of shareholder continuity in finding liability. The cases
appear to be split on the importance of shareholder continuity although the
majority of cases have not insisted on it for the imposition of liability.
Nevertheless, the conflict should not be overstated. Some of the cases with no
F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989), rev'd, 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991).
236. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
237. See, e.g., Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R., No. 4-88-692, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15,115 (D. Minn. 1990); American Nat'l. Can Co. v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp., No. 89 C 0168, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10,999 (N.D. I11. 1990); No. 89 C 0168, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,417 (N.D. Il. 1990);
United States v. Distler, 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1097 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
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shareholder continuity merely involved use of a wholly-owned subsidiary or
nominee shareholders who were family members, with no change in control.
Where control is unchanged, this is a strong basis for attaching liability. Where
there is a change in control, some courts may still find liability in a particular
case.
238
The cases in this Part are farthest from our general principles of CERCLA
liability, primarily because they arise in such different factual contexts from
the others. Successor liability is usually not based on successor management
of the business or handling of its waste. Rather, liability is determined primarily
by the extent to which the successor is really the same, or nearly the same,
business. Most of the cases look to the commercial reality of the continuing
business operations, although some continue to rely on the traditional
requirement of identical shareholders which may accurately reflect commercial
reality, or may only be testament to the planning ingenuity of careful counsel.
By emphasizing the question of whether the successor is, in fact, the same
business, these cases offer limited, indirect support for our liability principles.
VII. The Liability of Dissolved Corporations
Like the successor liability cases, the dissolved corporation liability cases
turn less on the particular management and waste handling practices of the
defendant than on identification of the proper party to be charged with liability.
However, unlike the forward-looking inquiry of successor liability, with
dissolved corporations, the look is backward in time since the proper corporate
actor is no longer available. The claim will ultimately be made against
shareholders who received assets formerly held by the corporation. Further, a
liability problem arises only for claims made after dissolution is completed.
Corporate dissolution statutes require that corporate obligations owed, as of
dissolution, be paid as part of the process of dissolving.239 Liability is clear
where the CERCLA claim is made within the statutory period for claims in
dissolution,' and where the corporate charter has been forfeited."4
238. The CERCLA successor liability cases apply general principles of tort and corporation law,
although in a new factual context. See generally BLUMBERG, supra note 13; Oswald & Schipani, supra note
11, at 318.
239. Audrey J. Anderson, Note, Corporate Life After Death: CERCLA Preemption of State Corporate
Dissolution Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 131 (1989). Where a potential CERCLA creditor was not given notice
of the dissolution until after the statutory period for claims, the dissolution was held ineffective to defeat
those claims. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. B.J. Carney & Co., 797 F. Supp. 1472 (D. Minn. 1992).
CERCLA claims against the assets of a corporation in bankruptcy will be discussed in Part VI below.
240. United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6789 (E.D. Mo. 1991). In dicta,
the court said it would apply Sharon.Steel to find liability if the claim had not been filed within the statutory
period. Id. at 17.
241. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1985),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
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The emerging CERCLA case law makes a critical distinction between
liability where the dissolution is still in progress and liability where the
dissolution has been completed. Where the dissolution process has been
completed with payment of known claims and proper distribution of assets to
shareholders, no case has found CERCLA liability. In contrast, liability has
been found where the dissolution is still on-going. The confused rationales and
overbroad holdings of important early cases have tended to obscure this clear
distinction. The situation is further complicated by a fundamental question of
whether CERCLA liability will preempt state law on corporate dissolutions.
The notion of CERCLA liability for completely dissolved corporations
presents a clear conflict with the dissolution procedures of state corporation
law.142 Under state law, the shareholders can dissolve a corporation and, after
paying all obligations and winding up its affairs, can receive distributions of
the remaining assets.3" The statutes provide a period-4ypically two or three
years-in which claims are to be presented. Claims not presented within that
period are barred.2 In general, Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure respects this state law determination of corporate capacity: "The
capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law
under which it was organized."2'
In contrast, CERCLA's liability provisions apply "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision or rule of law."246 Further, liability is effectively retroactive,
reaching the past activities of "persons" who generated wastes or owned or
operated a waste handling facility. "Persons" includes corporations with no
exception in the statutes for those corporations which have subsequently
dissolved. 7 Thus, under CERCLA, the corporation is literally liable for its
past hazardous waste activities; an intervening bar to liability created by state
corporate law of dissolution appears to be literally preempted. If CERCLA is
given this broad preemption interpretation, it would effectively nullify corporate
dissolutions for CERCLA purposes, and liability would attach as long as the
assets or their value could be traced to stockholders. To date, however, no cases
have extended CERCLA liability this far.
Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co.,2' an early case
finding no liability, was a substantial contributor to the confusion. The case
involved a dissolution that was completed nine years before CERCLA was
242. This section is based on BLUMBERG, supra note 11, at § 18.02.4 and BLUMBERO & STRASSER,
supra note 11, 1991 SUPPLEMENT § 18.02.5.
243. HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, § 348 (3d ed. 1983); 16A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, ch. 65 (1988).
244. Id. See also Anderson, supra note 239.
245. FED. R. CIv. P. 17(b).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The statute does have a limited number of specific defenses, but none are
relevant to these cases.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
248. Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).
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enacted and twelve years before suit was brought. Because CERCLA imposes
retroactive liability, Levin Metals Corp., the claimant, argued that the cause of
action arose when the waste handling activities took place, prior to the
defendant's dissolution. However, the court emphasized that CERCLA was not
passed until nine years after the dissolution and reasoned that the cause of
action could not have arisen under CERCLA prior to its passage. Of course,
this rationale will become less applicable over time because the acts giving rise
to liability are increasingly likely to take place after CERCLA's passage,
regardless of whether the claims precede dissolution.
Levin also argued that CERCLA preempted state dissolution law because
that law impedes accomplishment of the basic purposes of a federal law. In
rejecting this preemption claim, the court distinguished between state laws that
limit liability, and those that only determine legal capacity; only the former are
preempted.249
However, preemption policies do not support this distinction. Any state law
that interferes with accomplishing the purposes and objectives of a federal
statute should be preempted, regardless of how the state law characterizes the
problem. Preemption here should turn on whether the state law interferes with
CERCLA purposes and policies, rather than a distinction between liability limits
and capacity definitions in state law.
Despite this flaw in the court's reasoning, Levin has been generally
followed, although sometimes most reluctantly, 20 in cases in which the claim
is brought after dissolution is complete and assets have been distributed to
stockholders." These cases typically do not voice support for Levin's
rationale, but rather emphasize the long time period between dissolution and
bringing the claim-from five to nine years in the cases-and the lack of
precedent authorizing liability of a corporation whose "funeral is long over and
... [the corporation] is dead and buried. 2 52
This result reflects an unstated policy to protect individual shareholders
from claims against assets that formerly belonged to the corporation; all these
cases appear to concern small corporations whose assets had been distributed
to individual shareholders in the dissolution proceeding. The courts have not
articulated this policy as the basis for deciding these cases. However, it is
249. Id. at 1451.
250. The court in Columbia River Serv. v. Gilman, 751 F. Supp. 1448 (W.D. Wash. 1990), followed
Levin, but only with great reluctance, expressing its preference for liability but felt bound by Levin as
controlling Ninth Circuit precedent.
251. Onan Corp. v. Industrial Steel Corp., 770 F. Supp. 490 (D. Minn. 1989), aft'd, 909 F.2d 511 (8th
Cir.) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 875 (1990). cf. T-K City Disposal, Inc. v. Commercial
Unioni Ins. Co., 761 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that a dissolved corporation could not sue its
former insurance carrier for a CERCLA defense and liability coverage years after the dissolution.)
252. Id. at 555. See Onan Corp. v. Industrial Steel Corp., at 495 ("Not even the important policy goals
underlying CERCLA can resurrect [the dissolved corporation]"); United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 643
(W.D. Ky. 1990).
clearly related to one of the common law's most fundamental corporate law
policies which limits the liability of individual shareholders for corporate
obligations. Once the dissolution is complete and assets have been properly
distributed, shareholders should be protected from claims based on this
distribution, absent a corporate law violation or other fraudulent conveyance.
However, this policy is unlikely to be extended uncritically to the situation
where a corporate parent dissolves a subsidiary in its group and continues to
operate the assets in another part of the enterprise.
In contrast to Levin, United States v. Sharon Steel Corp.253 held that
CERCLA preempts state dissolution law and overrides Rule 17(b). The court's
preemption holding was clear:
This court joins those courts that have refused to 'interpret section
9607(a) in any way that apparently frustrates the statute's goals, in the
absence of a specific congressional intent otherwise.' Rather, given
CERCLA's broad remedial purpose and Congress' [sic] expressed intent
that those responsible for hazardous waste sites bear the cost of cleaning
them up, the court concludes that CERCLA's language-"any person"
who owned or operated a hazardous waste disposal site "shall be liable
for" cleanup costs [n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of
law"--clearly expresses Congfess's intent to supersede any rule that
would otherwise relieve a responsible party from liability.
2 54
Thus, the court declined to follow Levin's distinction between state statutes
limiting liability and those determining capacity: "Surely Congress could
preempt both state capacity statutes and state statutes limiting liability. The only
question in a particular case is whether Congress did." '255 Here, the court
concluded that Congress did preempt state law and as a result, the dissolved
corporation was potentially liable.
While the broad language and expansive reasoning of Sharon Steel conflict
with Levin, the cases can be distinguished on their facts. In Sharon Steel, the
dissolution was still in progress and the assets claimed were still held by those
managing the dissolution rather than the ultimate recipients. Thus, unlike Levin
and its progeny, Sharon Steel did not seek return of corporate assets that had
been permanently transferred to the shareholders at the end of a dissolution
process. Later cases have stressed this distinction, although the court did not
253. 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987). See Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kansas,
Inc., 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 2135, (D. Kan. Mar. 12, 1992); Traverse Bay Area Intermediate
School Dist. v. Hitco, 762 F. Supp. 1298 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (both applying Sharon Steel to deny the
defendant's motion for summary judgment and to order factual determination of whether undistributed assets
remained).
254. Sharon Steel, 681 F. Supp. at 1496 (citations omitted).
255. Id. at 1497.
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emphasize it in Sharon Steel. These cases typically express support for Sharon
Steel's rationale, but limit its holding to situations in which the dissolution is
still in progress and where at least some assets have not yet been transferred
to shareholders. 256 Both the weak reasoning in Levin and the overbroad rule
of Sharon Steel should be confined to their specific factual contexts.
The distinction between claims made against assets held by those managing
the dissolution and claims made against shareholders to recover distributions
is emerging as the rule in dissolution cases. This new rule achieves a
harmonization of CERCLA policies with state corporation law policies.
However, it will also have the unintended effect of strongly encouraging speedy
wind up and distribution of assets in dissolution cases, although the statutory
period for claims will still apply.
As with successor liability, these cases do not turn on specific behavior of
the defendants in managing the business and its waste handling. Rather, the key
here is to determine how far the dissolution process has progressed. The
distinction between claims against those managing a corporate dissolution and
claims against shareholders after completed dissolution provides some limited
support for the idea that the conduct of the business should be the reference
point for CERCLA liability. Assets held by those managing a corporate
dissolution are still part of the corporate enterprise and should be used for its
liabilities. In contrast, assets held by shareholders following a completed
distribution are not properly characterized as corporate assets and hence are not
available to satisfy the corporation's liabilities. In such a situation, shareholder
liability would have to be based on more than the managerially passive act of
shareholding.
VIII. Liability of Beneficiaries, Executors, and Trustees
The question of CERCLA liability can arise when property containing
hazardous substances is inherited, devised, or placed in trust, voluntarily or
through bankruptcy. CERCLA purports to protect individuals that. acquire
contaminated property by bequest or inheritance,257 by excluding such an
256. Distler, 741 F.Supp. at 646. See Columbia River Serv. v. Gilman, supra note 250; Stychno v. Ohio
Edison Co., 806 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ohio 1992); Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
23 Envtl. L. Rept. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,114 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
257. See Snediker Developers Ltd. Partnership v. Evans, 6 Toxics L. Rep. 586 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(individuals who inherited contaminated property were not liable for CERCLA cleanup costs). In Starr v.
Connecticut Dep't of Envtl. Protection, No. Civ 91-039-81-62 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 10, 1992), the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) ordered a decedent's wife to clean up the contaminated
property that she acquired upon her husband's death. Although the DEP's claim against the widow was
based upon sections 22a-431 and 22a-433 of the Connecticut General Statutes, and the court's decision was
based on the statutory construction of these sections, and not CERCLA, it is noteworthy that the court found
that the widow could not be held liable for the contamination. Facts pertinent to the court's decision were
that (1) the dumping of the pollutants at the site occurred long before the decedent owned the property, (2)
the decedent was not responsible for the polluting activity, and (3) the widow was denied access to the
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acquisition from the statutory definition of a covered contractual relationship.
However, the limited case law, CERCLA's legislative history, trust and estate
statutory authority, as well as the statutory authority given to trustees in
bankruptcy to operate a debtor's business, all leave lingering questions about
the protection given to such parties under CERCLA.
A. Beneficiary Liability
In United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc.,2 58 multiple parties
received various interests in the subject property over a period of time, by gift
or inheritance. All of the beneficiaries had been involved in the property either
through summer jobs or post-inheritance operations, and some should have
known of the hazardous substances at the facility when their clothing was eaten
away by battery acid during their summer jobs."s9 Despite these facts, the
Pacific Hide court held that none of the parties were liable as owners or
operators. In so holding, the court observed that CERCLA's legislative history
indicated that commercial transactions are to be treated differently from private
noncommercial transactions and inheritances. "Commercial transactions are held
to the strictest standard; private transactions are given a little more leniency;
and inheritances and bequests are treated the most leniently ...."260 The court
briefly analyzed the issue of whether the individuals knew or should have
known of the hazardous substances on the site and, determining that they did
not know, concluded, without explanation or analysis, that the individuals made
appropriate inquiries into the previous ownership and uses of the property
before accepting their gifts and inheritances.26" ' Consequently, the court found
that the individuals were not subject to CERCLA liability.
The case is significant because the court, albeit superficially, inquired into
the beneficiaries' knowledge of hazardous waste disposal. It was not content
to simply conclude that CERCLA imposed no liability upon the beneficiaries
because the gifts and inheritances involved no contractual relationship involving
such individuals, and that the contamination was the result of the activities of
individuals other than the defendants. The, court's consideration of the
beneficiaries' knowledge of the facility's contamination is consistent with
CERCLA's legislative history, which indicates that where the heirs or devisees
property for well over a year after her husband's death. Such evidence indicated to the court that the
"plaintiff's ownership of the property was utterly passive up to the time the pollution was discovered." Id.
at 3.
258. 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989).
259. Id. at 1348. In refusing to give weight to the evidence of the clothing eaten by battery acid, the
court noted that the case was brought because of PCB contamination, not battery acid contamination.
260. Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962,99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3276, 3279-80).
261. Id. at 1348-49.
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know of the presence of hazardous substances, or should have known to make
reasonable inquiry into the facility's compliance with environmental regulations,
liability may be imposed.262
B. Executor and Trustee Liability63
The executor of an estate accumulates the decedent's assets, pays the
decedent's debts, and distributes property to the devisees. In essence, and in
function, an executor acts as a conduit for the proper allocation of the
decedent's resources. The devisees, not the executor, hold legal title to the
decedent's real property. Therefore, although no court has been faced with the
issue, it seems likely that an executor will not be held liable as an owner if the
devised property is contaminated by a hazardous substance.""
Executors may become vulnerable to CERCLA liability as operators,
however, through the execution of their duties in administering the decedent's
estate. Under the Uniform Probate Code,265 an executor may be authorized
and even required, to perform various acts that involve the operation of a
facility. Except as provided by the decedent's will,
every [executor] has a right to, and shall take possession or control of,
the decedent's property, except that any real property or tangible
personal property may be left with or surrendered to the person
presumptively entitled thereto unless or until, in the judgment of the
personal representative, possession of the property by him will be
necessary for purposes of administration.... The [executor] shall pay
taxes on, and take all steps reasonably necessary for the management,
protection and preservation of, the estate in his possession.266
Additionally, an executor may (1) perform, compromise, or refuse
performance of the decedent's contracts, (2) convey and lease land, (3) manage,
262. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, supra note 260, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3279-81.
263. Although the term "executor" will be used throughout, it should be noted that this discussion is
equally applicable to an "administrator" of an estate. An executor administers the decedent's will; an
administrator administers an estate, distributing property to the decedent's heirs according to the state's
intestacy statute, where the decedent dies intestate.
264. It should be noted, however, that the bankruptcy cases and CERCLA's legislative history indicate
that "equivalent evidence of ownership" may lead to the imposition of personal liability on an executor as
a facility owner. See §§ C, infra; In re T.P. Long Chem. Co., 45 B.R. 278, 283 (N.D. Ohio 1985); H.R.
REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 6181.
265. UNIF. PROBATE CODE, §§ 1-101 to 8-102, 8 U.L.A. (1983).
266. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-709 (1991).
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develop, exchange, and change the character of an estate asset, (4) make repairs
and alterations to buildings or other structures, and (5) continue any
unincorporated business.267
An executor performing these duties may easily become an operator for
CERCLA purposes. To date, no reported opinions have concerned the potential
liability of executors. By analogy, however, from the decisions concerning
corporate officers and directors who also manage the assets of others under a
fiduciary responsibility, 68 it would appear that an executor will likely be held
liable for CERCLA cleanup costs if she (1) assumes and exercises responsibility
for waste handling, or (2) exercises a high level of supervision over the general
operations of a facility. However, the analogy to corporate officers and directors
cases also teaches that liability will arise only for disposal during the period
of management.269
A trustee of a testamentary or inter vivos trust faces similar potential
liability as either an owner or an operator. A trustee holds the most fundamental
indicia of ownership, legal title to trust property.270 Further, trust instruments
and state statutes typically endow the trustee with broad authority to use and
manage the trust property, 271 and a trustee exercising these powers may well
become liable as a CERCLA operator.
In United States v. Burns2 72 the potential CERCLA liability of a trustee
as an owner of the facility was considered.2 73 Crowley, the trustee of property
on which hazardous substances had been disposed, was sued by the EPA to
recover its costs of cleaning the contaminated property. Crowley moved to
dismiss the action claiming that he could not be held liable as he never owned
the subject property or participated in the illegal conduct.274 The court denied
Crowley's motion, noting that given the facts alleged, if true, Crowley could
be considered an owner of the site for two reasons. First, "[tihe term 'owner,'
like the Act generally, should be construed broadly,"2 75 and second,
CERCLA's legislative history indicated that the term "owner" includes title
holders of property. 276 Crowley, as trustee, held legal title to the trust
267. Id. § 3-715(3), (6), (7), (9), [on leases] and (24).
268. See supra Part 11.
269. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 21.
270. This is true for both testamentary and inter vivos trusts. See G. BOCIART, TRUSTS § 1 (6th ed.
1987). See also In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 973,314 (Bankr. D. Mass. Sept.
13, 1989) (trustees of the property (not the trustees in bankruptcy) were the present property owners and
were therefore liable under § 9607(a) of CERCLA as owners).
271. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 175 (1959).
272. United States v. Burns, No. C-88-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340 (D.N.H. Sept. 12, 1988).
273. It appears that Crowley was trustee for an inter vivos trust.
274. Burns, No. C-88-94-L, 1988 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 17,340, at *1.
275. Id. at *3 (internal quotes and citation omitted). "CERCLA is essentially a remedial statute designed
by Congress to protect and preserve public health and the environment. We are therefore obligated to
construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative purposes." Id.
276. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160,
6181).
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property, and under trust law, could be liable for obligations as the owner of
the property.277 The decision was a straightforward application of the term
"owner" to anyone who holds legal title to contaminated property encumbered
by CERCLA liability." 8
In City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co.,279 the court considered
whether a trustee could be held liable as an operator.3 The trustee exercised
a purchase option of the decedent's and purchased a landfill being managed by
and leased to Garbage Services Company (GSC). The trustee continued leasing
the site to GSC for the next six years, after which time, the landfill was closed.
Throughout that period of time, the trustee paid the property taxes on the site
and procured liability insurance for the landfill. After the City of Phoenix
incurred cleanup costs at the site, it filed an action against the trustee.
The court held that operator liability only attaches where the defendant had
control over the day-to-day management and administration of the facility.2"'
Mere authority to conduct such management was not enough. 212 The trustee
did not enter into or negotiate contracts for the disposal of wastes, nor did it
know the identity or the nature of GSC's customers. The trustee's
communication with GSC's personnel was limited to such matters as tax
277. Id. Crowley was also the beneficiary of the trust. The court observed that Crowley could similarly
be held liable as an owner in his dual capacity as a trustee and beneficiary. Id.
Although Burns indicates that trustees can be held personally liable under CERCLA, trustees have the
right to indemnification out of the trust property. G. BOGART, TRUSTS § 132 (6th ed. 1987). Where cleanup
costs exceed the value of the trust property, however, the trustee, as an "owner" of the property, would
appear to be personally liable. While this result may seem harsh, it is prudent in those cases where the value
of the trust property is exceeded by the cleanup costs. If an individual thought that liability could be avoided
by simply establishing a trust, the ability to implement and enforce CERCLA's provisions would be seriously
undercut.
See also infra, note 278 and text accompanying notes 279-83, discussing the decision in City of
Phoenix v. Garbage Serv. Co., No. C 89-1709 SC (D. Az. Jan. 19, 1993).
278. The contamination of the trust property in Burns occurred while Crowley was trustee for the
property. While this fact may have influenced the court's decision if the court had engaged in an "operator"
analysis, because the court instead relied on Crowley's status as the property's owner, this fact should not
have affected the court's determination.
In City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1491 (E.D. Pa. 1989), the traditional route
for imposing CERCLA liability on the owner or operator of trust property was abandoned and a successor
liability theory pursued. In that case, the decedent's estate apparently had no money from which the city
could recoup its cleanup costs. The city therefore sued a trust that the decedent had established for his
daughter. The court held that the trustee never expressly or implicitly agreed to assume the obligations of
the decedent's business and therefore was not liable for cleanup costs.
See also United States v. Petersen Sand and Gravel Inc., No. 91 C 5835, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13,268
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1992). In that case, the court ruled that a trustee who merely held title to contaminated
property, without any other incident of ownership, was not an owner under CERCLA. In analyzing the"
trustee's liability, the court explained that the trust was created at common law and had one duty only: to
hold and dispose of legal title at the written direction of the beneficiary. It was the beneficiary who retained
all other incidents of real property ownership, including full management and control of the property.
279. No. C 89-1709 SC (D. Az. Jan. 19, 1993).
280. The court also considered whether the trustee could be held liable as an owner. The court found
that a trustee is an owner for the purposes of CERCLA liability, even though the trustee may hold only bare
legal title. Id. at 9.
281. Id. at 5.
282. Id. at 5-6.
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questions, and not the operation of the landfill. Accordingly, the court held that
the trustee was not liable as an operator under CERCLA.
28 3
Although the City of Phoenix decision did not find the trustee liable as an
operator, the decision does not mean that a trustee will never be held liable as
an operator. On different facts, a trustee exercising his or her powers as a
trustee could well be found liable as an operator.
Trustees typically are given broad powers within trust instruments and under
state law to deal with trust property. The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act2
is representative of the typical statutory provisions adopted by many states
which delineates the powers of a trustee.285 Under this Act, the trustee is
empowered to: (1) continue or participate in the operation of any business or
enterprise;" 6 (2) invest trust assets; 87 (3) manage, develop, or improve a
trust asset;"5 (4) repair, alter, or demolish, or raze existing buildings;2 9 and
(5) enter into leases. 9° These broad powers make it highly probable that a
trustee dealing with trust property contaminated with hazardous substances
could readily incur CERCLA "operator" liability.2 9' While the absence of
case law leaves some uncertainty, once again the corporate officer and director
liability cases offer the best analogy. Based upon that area of law,292 it seems
quite likely that courts will hold a trustee liable as an operator if the trustee
assumes and exercises responsibility for waste handling, or exercises a high
level of supervision over a facility's operations.29
C. Bankruptcy Trustees
If a bankrupt debtor's conduct results in the release or threatened release
of hazardous substances, the assets of the bankrupt estate can be reached for
CERCLA cleanup costs.294 The potential liability of a trustee in bankruptcy
is, however, a more problematic question.
283. Id.
284. The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act can be found within the Uniform Probate Code. See 8 U.L.A.
§2-101 (1983).
285. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 45-100f(7) (1989).





291. Because of the special status trustees hold, especially with respect to a testamentary trust, the
imposition of CERCLA liability may seem unduly harsh. It should be noted, however, that trust law also
imposes liability without fault on trustees. A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 265.4, at 459 (4th ed. 1988).
292. See supra Part II.
293. See Denise Rodosevich, The Expansive Reach of CERCLA Liability: Potential Liability of
Executors of Wills and Inter Vivos and Testamentary Trustees, 55 ALBANY L. REV. 143 (1991).
294. See, e.g., In re National Gypsum Co., No. 3-91-1653-H (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 1992); New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. North Am. Prods. Acquisition Corp., No. 91-4602 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 1992); Penn
Cent. Corp. v. United States, No. 91-761 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1992).
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When a business declares bankruptcy, a "trustee in bankruptcy" may be
designated to, among other things, manage the business or property while the
creditors and their priority of interests are determined. Although such
management would seem to leave a trustee of a bankrupt corporation open to
liability for CERCLA cleanup costs as an operator of a facility, to date, owner
or operator liability of trustees has been narrowly construed and no trustee in
bankruptcy has yet to be held personally liable for cleanup costs. Nevertheless,
the courts have implied that trustees may be reachable as operators, under the
right circumstances.
In re T.P. Long Chemical Co.295 considered the personal liability of a
trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee administered a bankrupt estate that included
property upon which drums of hazardous material were stored. As a result of
vandalism, hazardous substances were released on the property during the
trustee's management of the estate. The EPA cleaned up the release and brought
suit against the bankrupt estate to recoup the cleanup costs. For reasons not
apparent from the facts, the trustee raised the personal defense that he was not
an owner or operator of the facility, and therefore, the estate could not be held
liable under CERCLA. By so arguing, the court was afforded the opportunity
to comment on the trustee's personal liability assertion.
The Ohio Bankruptcy Court concluded that the trustee was not an owner
or operator. "In the sense that the trustee did not acquire title to the property
of the estate, he is technically correct that he is not an owner of the Long
facility." 96 The court went on, however, to observe that "[iun the sense that no
business operations were being conducted at the Long facility at the time the
trustee was appointed, he is technically correct that he is not an operator of the
facility." '297 The court therefore left open the possibility that a trustee may
be held liable as an operator if operations are ongoing during the trustee's
oversight of the bankrupt estate. Because both Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code298 authorize a trustee to operate a debtor's business, the
potential operator liability of a trustee in bankruptcy is quite likely.299
295. 45 B.R. 278.
296. Id. at 283.
297. Id.
298. The Bankruptcy Code provides: "Unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may operate the
debtor's business." 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (1988). It also provides: "The court may authorize the trustee to
operate the business of the debtor for a limited period, if such operation is in the best interest of the estate
and consistent with the orderly liquidation of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 721.
299. See also In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943 (W.D. Mich. 1987)
y. The bankrupt estate was not operating the facility, so operator status would be inapplicable. However,
the estate was the "owner" of the site and therefore could not escape CERCLA liability.
Of possible historic interest is the fact that under the former Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § I I0(a), a
trustee in bankruptcy did acquire title to the bankrupt's property, and therefore certainly would have been
found to be an owner under CERCLA.
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Conclusion: Seeing the Forest for the Trees
Looking beyond the trees, the many diverse cases and fact patterns that exist
in the area of CERCLA liability, one can see the forest. CERCLA liability is
not so elusive and ill-defined as often argued. Some rather straight-forward
principles appear to guide liability, albeit in unanticipated ways. Those who
manage a business will be held liable for the disposal of its hazardous
substances. Liability will also extend to those who specifically manage the
disposal of hazardous substances when there is a release or threatened release.
Despite language in a few opinions, this study also establishes a related
corollary principle: Parties far removed from the management of a business or
its hazardous substances will not be held liable as operators or arrangers simply
because they have the ultimate, unexercised capacity to control such substances.
These general principles have been obscured by the way cases have
conventionally been grouped for decision and commentary. The emphasis has
been on specific fact patterns, such as parent-subsidiary or lender liability. As
a result, the discussion and analysis has largely confined itself to these groups
and general principles have not emerged. This narrow approach deprives courts
and counsel of the information available from other groups of cases and from
the general liability principles this Article proposed.
The strength of these principles is shown by the wide diversity of cases and
fact patterns that support them. Strong support is found in the cases concerning
parent and subsidiary corporations, corporate officers, directors and
shareholders, lenders, and government regulators. Support is apparent in the
case of bankruptcy trustees, bankrupt corporations, inter vivos trustees, as well
as executors and beneficiaries of wills, though, this support is based on
somewhat limited case authority. Contractual arrangement cases also offer some
support. Because the cases that look forward with respect to time, successor
corporation cases, and backward, dissolved corporation cases, to identify the
liable corporate actor present different issues and different fact patterns, these
two groups of cases provide only indirect support for our hypothesis.
This Article has demonstrated that a common basis exists upon which
judges have determined CERCLA liability, regardless of whether the case
concerns traditional CERCLA liability categories or, the more attenuated status
of lenders, parent corporations, or bankruptcy trustees. Close analysis of the
case law provides the foundation from which the general principles of CERCLA
liability emerge. By viewing CERCLA liability cases in this manner, the forest
can be seen for the trees.
Vol. 10: 493, 1993
